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Notes
VOUCHING FOR FEDERAL EDUCATIONAL
CHOICE: IF YOU PAY THEM,
THEY WILL COME
Education,.. beyond all other devices of human origin, is
a great equalizer of conditions of men-the balance wheel of
the social machinery.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of the educational voucher is by no means novel.2 The
educational voucher was, discussed in several early classic works.3 Thomas
1. Horace Mann, 1848, quoted in Walter Shapiro, Tough Choice, TIME, Sept. 16, 1991, at 54.2. See infra section II.B., notes 65-84 and accompanying text. The terms "voucher" and
.school choice" are not always interchangeable. The main difference between a voucher plan anda school choice plan is the inclusion of private and religious institutions as meaningful alternativesin the former. Carol L. Ziegler & Nancy M. Lederman, School Vouchers: Are Urban StudentsSurrendering Rights for Choice?, 19 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 813, 816 (1992). While these terms are
not always interchangeable, this author utilizes the phrase "choice through vouchers" since a true
choice cannot be made without having all of the available alternatives presented. The choice through
voucher concept seeks to improve education's quality and efficiency by injecting competition intothe market for educational services. The government does this by partially or completely subsidizingthe parents and students' choice of which school to attend. Thus, schools will be forced to competefor students, and consequently will provide the type and quality of education that is desired.3. The concept of educational vouchers predates the United States of America. Although nottitled a voucher, it first appeared in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations in 1776. DAVID W.KIRKPATRICK, CHOICE IN SCHOOLING: A CASE FOR TUITION VOUCHERS 1 (1990). The concept
was dubbed a "voucher" by University of Chicago economist Milton Friedman. Milton Friedman,The Role Of Government In Education, in ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC INTEREST 123 (Robert A. Solo
ed., 1955). The concept was also referred to in Thomas Paine's 1792 classic, The Rights of Man.
KIRKPATRICK, supra. Furthermore, John Stuart Mill, in 1859, stated:
An education established and controlled by the State should only exist, if it exist at all,
as one among many competing experiments, carried on for the purpose of example and
stimulus to keep the others up to a certain standard of excellence . . . [I]f [a] country
contains a sufficient number of persons qualified to provide education under government
auspices, the same persons would be able ... to give an equally good education on the
voluntary principle, under the assurance of remuneration afforded by a law rendering
education compulsory, combined with State aid to those unable to defray the expense.John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, reprinted in part in GEORGE R. LA NOUE, EDUCATIONAL VOUCHERS:
CONCEPTS AND CONTROVERSIES 4 (1972).
More recently, an Atlanta attorney discovered a 1961 Georgia law that requires the state to
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Jefferson proposed a similar concept in his 1779 school bill.4 While the
educational voucher concept received little attention in these early periods,, it
remains clear that the voucher concept is not new. Despite the voucher's low-
profile history, education itself has always played an important role in society.
Education in our society is of primary importance. The Supreme Court
of the United States has continually emphasized the importance of education in
our society.' However, the quality of public education has been questioned.'
provide tuition scholarships to parents whose children attend private schools. Choice Reality, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 21, 1993, at A22. The Georgia law allots an educational grant to every child between
the ages of six and 19 who resides in Georgia, has not graduated or finished high school, and is
otherwise qualified to attend the elementary and secondary public schools. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-
642 (1992). The grant is paid in lieu of attending the public school system and for the purpose of
defraying the cost of attending a nonsectarian private school anywhere in the United States. Id.
4. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 3, at 25. Jefferson's educational proposals were not well received
by the Virginia legislature, and consequently were not implemented. LAWRENCE A. CREMIN,
AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 443 (1970).
5. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 3, at 25. Perhaps the reason for this lack of attention to
educational vouchers in its early period was because the early works on the topic were not regarded
as educational works. Id. For example, Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations was dedicated to laissez-
faire economics, while Thomas Paine's and John Stuart Mill's works focused on politics and
philosophy. Id. However, more recent works, such as Friedman's The Role of Government in
Education, have focused on education and how government can improve the educational system.
6. MILTON FRIEDMAN, FREE To CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 150 (Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich 1990) ("Education has always been a major component of the American Dream.").
Also, an educated society will be better equipped to confront the challenges that are presented by
modem technology, science, and thought. Lane Kirkland, The Public School and the Common
Good, 33 J. TCHR. EDUC. 2, 3 (1982). The importance of education in American society was
evident from its very beginning. For example, a plat of land was set aside in every possible
township for the promotion of education under the Articles of Confederation, the Ordinance of 1787.
18 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 48 (15th ed. 1993).
7. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (noting that public schools were viewed "as the
primary vehicle for transmitting 'the values on which our society rests'") (quoting Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979)); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75-76 (1979) (holding that
state restrictions on teacher certification based on alienage is within the Sugarman exception and
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause since teachers have the opportunity to affect attitudes
towards government, the political process and social responsibilities); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30 (1972) (noting that education is the very foundation of good
citizenship and the primary method of instilling cultural values); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Public schools ...[are] a most vital civic
institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government."); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("[Education] is the very foundation of good citizenship .... [The
school] serves [as] a principle instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him
for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.").
8. The poor quality of education was evidenced by a recent congressional finding that "many
elementary and secondary schools [are] structured according to models that are outdated and
ineffective." H.R. 2460, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., Title I, § 101(l)(a) (1991). Furthermore,
Congress concluded that many students are not provided with the skills and knowledge necessary
to succeed in the workplace and the world economy. Id. §§ 101(l)(c), 101(2). See also David
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Since the 1800s, when compulsory education laws were enacted,9 many
experts" have questioned the efficiency as well as the quality of public
education." These laws gave the public school system a virtual monopoly in
Boaz, School Reform Was A Failure; Try Vouchers, INSIGHT, July 5, 1993, at 18 ("American
students ranked 13th on a 1992 international science test taken by students from 15 countries.");
Robert Rector, A Comprehensive Urban Policy: How To Fir Welfare And Revitalize America's Inner
Cities, 12 MEMO TO: PRESIDENT-ELECT CLINTON 11 (Jan. 18, 1993) (available from the Heritage
Foundation, 214 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E., Washington D.C. 20002-4999) (citing that half of
the Chicago public high schools rank in the bottom one percent of the nation in scholastic
achievement); Ernest Van Den Haag, Why Do American Kids Learn So Little, NATIONAL REVIEW,
Aug. 3, 1992, at 34 ("[American] children learn far less in school than European and Japanese
children do, although America spends far more per pupil."); W. Terence Walsh, A Safety Net For
Dropouts, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 128 (citing that in the United States a student drops out of
school every 10 seconds of each school day).
9. Compulsory attendance laws are a general part of a state's educational system. 68 AM. JUR.
2D Schools § 228 (1993) [hereinafter Schools]. The idea for compulsory attendance in education
was present as early as the 16th century. Martin Luther, in 1524, argued for the German state to
establish compulsory public schools. R. J. LYTLE, LIBERTY SCHOOLS 54 (1975). Also during the
16th century, compulsory public education was advocated in Geneva by John Calvin. Id.
Modem attendance laws are premised on the idea that the primary purpose of the educational
system is to train children to be good and loyal citizens. In Re Shinn, 195 Cal. App. 2d 683, 686
(1961); Schools, supra, § 228. Thus, parents owe a duty not only to the child, but also to the state
to educate their child and may be coerced into performing such duty when the parents refuse to
perform this obligation. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (noting that the natural
duty of parents is to provide their children with an education suitable for their station in life); State
v. Baily, 61 N.E. 730, 732 (Ind. 1901) (holding that the welfare of the child and the best interest
of society obligates the state to use its power to secure an educational opportunity for the child when
the parent fails to fulfill this obligation); Commonwealth v. Beiler, 79 A.2d 134, 137 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1951) (commenting that parents have no constitutional right to deprive their children of an
education or to prevent the state from assuring children an adequate preparation for life in a
democratic society); Schools, supra, § 228. Furthermore, compulsory attendance laws have
withstood constitutional challenges. See State v. Garber, 419 P.2d 896, 902 (Kan. 1966) (holding
that a state's compulsory attendance law is a valid exercise of a state's police power), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 51 (1967); Commonwealth v. Bey, 70 A.2d 693, 695 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1950) (holding that
a compulsory attendance law that allows a parent to choose the school that their child is to attend
is within constitutional limits); Rice v. Commonwealth, 49 S.E.2d 342, 346 (Va. 1948) (holding that
despite religious convictions that children must be taught by their parents, a statute requiring parents
to send their children to a public, private, or parochial school, or to have them taught at home by
qualified teachers, does not deprive parents of due process or equal protection of the laws).
10. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at ch. 6 (arguing for an unregulatedvoucher to remove public
schools' inefficiencies); KIRKPATRICK, supra note 3, at 10 (noting that former Labor Secretary
William Brock stated that 700,000 high school graduates annually are functionally illiterate).
11. Stephen Arons, Educational Choice: Unanswered Questions in the American Experience,
in FAMILY CHOICE AND SCHOOLING: ISSUES AND DILEMMAS 23-24 (Michael E. Manley-Casmir
ed., 1982). See also KIRKPATRICK, supra note 3, at 10. A 1967 study of Indiana history teachers
indicated that the average teacher surveyed read less than one book in his or her field annually. Id.
However, all educators are not to blame for the failings of the public education system. During his
term as the Pennsylvania State Education Association president, Colin Greer stated, "Educators must
cease supporting a facade of quality where the substance is missing. Our schools have never
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providing education.12 However, along with the criticism have come many
plans to improve the efficiency and quality of public education in America.'
3
Most recently, then-President George Bush proposed the America 2000 bill
14
which sought to provide funding to states that would, among other things,
implement a voucher scheme.15  These plans 6 are a testament to the value
that society places on education.
Proponents of educational choice 7 cite several compelling arguments in
favor of a voucher system. They argue that the voucher will empower parents
and give them greater control over their childrens' education.'8 In addition,
approached the effectiveness they should have, and they do not approach it now. We need not hide
that fact, nor be apologetic for it, since we have not been responsible for it." Id. at 17.
12. A pure monopoly is defined as a single seller of a product or service that has no close
substitutes. DAVID N. HYMAN, MODERN MICROECONoMICS 365 (2d ed. 1989). While public
education is not the only seller of education, it retains virtual monopoly power because unlike private
schools, no tuition is charged since all taxpayers bear the burden of financing public education. In
effect, public schools retain their monopoly power because they are "giving" education for "free"
while other nonpublic schools must charge tuition. See infra note 279.
13. See JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
(Brookings Inst., 1990) [hereinafter POLITICS] (proposing that each school district have sole authority
to determine its structure subject to minimal certification for teachers so as to encourage and promote
the entry of individuals outside the teaching profession to teach); JOHN E. COONS & STEPHEN D.
SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE FOR FAMILY CONTROL (1978) [hereinafter FAMILY
CONTROL] (proposing a "scholarship certificate" be given to each school-age child and that the
certificate should not incorporate an "add-on" feature whereby parents could increase the certificate's
value); FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, ch. 6 (proposing an unregulated voucher in which the market
forces would ensure that the quality of education would rise).
14. See infra notes 85-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the America 2000 bill.
15. See infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of the funding scheme
proposed under the America 2000 bill.
16. See infra section H.C., notes 85-120 and accompanying text.
17. A few examples of such proponents are: Citizens for Educational Freedom, The Brookings
Institute, Council For Educational Freedom in America, Freedom Council and The National Center
for Privatization. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 3, at 171-74.
18. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 160. Friedman notes that "parents generally have both
greater interest in their children's schooling and more intimate knowledge than anyone else." Id.
Friedman further states that it is a "gratuitous insult" when educational and social reformers
speculate that parents have little interest in their child's education and no competence to choose for
them. Id. Also, history has demonstrated that when allowed to choose, parents have been willing
to sacrifice and have done so wisely for their children's benefit. Id. Other scholars have argued
that parents possess a special competence to make educational decisions concerning their children.
See FAMILY CONTROL, supra note 13, at 53. The family's special ability to listen and know their
child, as well as the deep personal care that the family has for the child, qualifies the parent as an
excellent "senior partner for the decision-making team." Id. Moreover, the interest in directing a
child's education is central to a parent's privacy rights protected under the Constitution. See
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990) (characterizing the invalidation of a
compulsory attendance law, as applied to the Amish, in Wisconsin v. Yoder as being based on a
parent's right to direct the education of their children as well as the Free Exercise Clause); Brantley
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 [1995], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol29/iss2/9
1995] EDUCATIONAL VOUCHERS 1009
providing parents with the power to choose a nonpublic school for their child
will compel the public school system to compete with the nonpublic schools for
students, 9 thus forcing public schools to increase the quality and efficiency of
the school's services.' Moreover, despite voucher opponents' arguments to
the contrary, 2' a voucher scheme would also save the taxpayers money. 22
Furthermore, fifty-one percent of public school parents surveyed would prefer
a voucher system that would give them the ability to send their children to
nonpublic schools.'
v. Surles, 718 F.2d 1354, 1359 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that a state's power to control the education
of its citizens is secondary to the rights of parents to provide equivalent education for their children).
19. After citing a massive study of public and private high school education in the United Statesby University of Chicago Professor James Coleman, Gary Becker stated, "[o]n the whole, private
schools do a better job of educating their pupils." Gary S. Becker, What Our Schools Need is a
Healthy Dose of Competition, Bus. WK., Dec. 18, 1989, at 28. Coleman found that Catholic
schools spend much less than larger inner-city schools and yet the private schools are more
successful because they are subjected to less political interference and have parental involvement in
the education process. Id. Academically, Coleman found evidence of higher basic cognitive skills
in Catholic schools than in public schools. James S. Coleman, Quality and Equality in American
Education: Public and Catholic Schools, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Nov. 1981, at 159. Further, the
intent to pursue higher education was greater for students at Catholic schools. Id.
20. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 158-71 (arguing that market forces Will increase the quality
of public education when parents and students may choose); Larry Armstrong, California May
Choose School Choice, Bus. WK., Oct. 18, 1993, at 34 (quoting the orchestrator of the signature
program for Proposition 174 as stating "Education is now just a monopoly .... Our objective is
to bring the forces of the marketplace to bear to force public schools to improve").
21. See Jeanne Allen, Nine Phoney Assertions About School Choice, USA TODAY (magazine),
July 1993, at 46 (citing nine arguments raised in opposition to choice programs); Susan Chira,
Research Questions the Effectiveness of Most School-Choice Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1992,
at Al (citing a Carnegie Foundation report that choice programs do not necessarily improve student
performance, require additional money and may cause segregation among students).
22. For example, in California education costs approximately $5200 per pupil annually, which
is about the average for the country. William T. Huston, Free-Enterprise Education, INDUSTRY
WK., June 1, 1992, at 36; The Price Of Choice, ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 1993, at 25. However, the
voucher plan (Proposition 174) which was proposed on the California ballot in November of 1993
would supply a $2600 voucher to California parents of school children. Marie Puente, Calif. Vote
May Spawn New School Voucher Plan, USA TODAY, Nov. 2, 1993, at 3A. When parents exercise
their power to send their child to a nonpublic school, the state will be relieved of the burden of
educating that child. The cost to the state to give parents the power to choose would be
approximately $2600, the amount of the Proposition 174 voucher, a savings of $2600 per pupil
annually. Id. This result is a mutually beneficial outcome because the state has saved taxpayer
dollars while the parents and children have greater control over the education of the child. Cf.
Walsh, supra note 8 (noting that each school failure costs society a minimum of $440,000 in lost
earnings and foregone taxes along with the costs of crime and public assistance which are associated
with school failures) (citing the Committee for Economic Development).
23. The Gallup Poll survey asked:
In some nations the government allots a certain amount of money for each child for his
education. The parents can send the child to any public, parochial, or private school
they choose. This is called a 'voucher system'.. Would you like to see such an idea
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However, not everyone is in favor of educational choice and vouchers.'
Opponents argue that such a scheme would abandon the poor and difficult
students while the better students would migrate to the best schools,25 thus
destroying the long tradition of American schools.' Further, they claim that
there are large hidden costs associated with school choice programs, such as
transportation costs.27 Some argue that privatization of education will remove
constitutional protections including legally defined procedural and participatory
rights enjoyed by students and parents.' Still others claim that vouchers will
adopted in this country?
Alec M. Gallup, The 18th Annual Gallup Poll of the Public's Attitudes Towards the Public Schools,
PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Sept. 1986, at 58.
24. Opposition to voucherscomes from predictable quarters: Civil Liberties Organizations with
first amendment concerns like the American Jewish Committee, The American Federation of
Teachers, and The National Education Association. Ziegler & Lederman, supra note 2, at 819.
25. Jeanne Allen, Phoney Assertions About School Choice, EDUCATION DIGEST, March 1992,
at 52. Allen argues that this assertion assumes that the low-income families cannot tell the difference
between the good and bad schools. Id. Allen further asserts that separation of the "haves" and
"have nots" currently exists because the "haves" already possess a choice since they have the money
to choose private schooling. Id. Thus, a choice program will allow the "have nots" to also engage
in choice. Id. See also Nanette Asimov et al., Education Initiative, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Mar.
16, 1992, at Al (arguing that because low-income families do not have the finances to "add-on" to
any voucher, opponents envision a two-tiered educational system that would favor the wealthy since
the value of the voucher would most likely not completely cover the cost of private tuition).
26. Allen, supra note 25. However, public schools do not now follow the common-school
philosophy because they are exclusive and segregational. Id. A choice program will restore the
common-school tradition by restoring the quality of education and holding schools accountable for
results. Id. But see Asimov et al., supra note 25 (arguing that the voucher's cost would siphon
money away from the public school system, resulting in further deterioration of the system).
27. Allen, supra note 25, at 55. Allen argues that a choice program would not necessarily
increase costs. Id. Increased efficiency would lead to lower administrative costs. Id. Further,
transportation costs would not necessarily increase because new and better schools, close to the
students, would emerge through the operation of market forces. Id.
28. Public school students are entitled to due process protection from school suspensions and
expulsions. Ziegler & Lederman, supra note 2, at 820. The Supreme Court, in Goss v. Lopez, held
that a liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment is implicated when students are suspended
or excluded from school. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). Private schools however are unlikely to be
transformed into state actors merely because students are able to attend the school through the use
of a voucher. See Ziegler & Lederman, supra note 2, at 824.
There are two basic theories under which a private party can be held to be a state actor. The
first of these theories is the traditional public function approach. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649, 663 (1944) (holding that the delegation of the power to determine the qualifications of primary
elections has traditionally been a public function); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966)
(holding that since services by a private park are municipal in nature and traditionally serve the
community, state action was present). State action can also be found in private parties where a
nexus exists between the state and private party. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1948)
(holding that where a court enforces a racially restrictive covenant against a willing seller and buyer,
state action is present); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1961) (holding
that a racially discriminatory restaurant, which leased space from a state owned parking facility, is
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lead to racial segregation.' The opponents further charge that because many
choice schemes permit governmental funds to flow to sectarian schools, such
schemes would violate the Establishment Clause)0  Without doubt, the
opponents of a choice program will raise many, if not all of these arguments.
This Note examines the concept of educational choice through vouchers and
proposes federal implementation of such a scheme for elementary and secondary
education. 3 Section II of this Note discusses the public educational system and
its problems. 2 This Section will also explore the concept of educational choice
and vouchers,33 as well as several choice schemes that are either in effect or
have been proposed.' Section III of this Note will address the constitutional
issues raised by such a scheme.35  Specifically, this Section will address the
establishment clause concerns' in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District.37 This Section will also
discuss the equal protection concerns of educational voucher schemes.'
Finally, Section IV will conclude by proposing federal legislation, in the form
a state actor); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (1991) (holding that a
private civil litigant using racially based peremptory challenges is a state actor since the deprivation
had its source in state authority and the private litigant acted with significant government assistance);
Rendall-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 n.6 (1982) (requiring not only a sufficiently close nexus
between the state and private party but also between the state involvement and the resulting
deprivation).
Zielger & Lederman argue that since private school operators are not state actors subject to
the fourteenth amendment due process constraints, liberty interests are in danger of deprivation
without the due process required at state schools. Ziegler & Lederman, supra note 2, at 824.
However, the legislation proposed by this note requires private schools not to discriminate. Thus,
regardless of whether state action is presented, discrimination will be controlled under the proposed
scheme.
29. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 165. See also Chira, supra note 21, at Al ("A report... by
the Carnegie Foundation,. . . a leading educational research group, is the latest of several to argue
that choice primarily benefits children of better-educated parents . . . and may actually widen the
gap between rich and poor school districts."); Clint Bolick, Choice in Education, Part II, 809
BACKGROUNDER 3 (Feb. 18, 1991) (available from the Heritage Foundation, 214 Massachusetts
Avenue, N.E., Washington D.C. 2002-4999) (noting that critics of educational choice often cite
promotion of racial segregation in opposition to any such program).
30. The Constitution of the United States, in pertinent part, states: "Congress shall make no
law respecting the establishment of religion.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
31. See infra notes 65-84 and accompanying text and section IV.A.
32. See infra notes 41-64 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 65-84 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 85-120 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 121-266 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 127-229 and accompanying text.
37. 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993). The Court, without applying the traditional Lemon analysis, held
that a state providing a sign-language interpreter, pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Act,
to a student attending a Roman Catholic high school, did not violate the Establishment Clauae. Id.
38. See infra notes 230-66 and accompanying text.
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of federal income tax deductions or positive tax credits,39 to implement an
educational choice through voucher program in the United States for elementary
and secondary education.'
II. THE CONCEPT OF EDUCATIONAL CHOICE AND VOUCHERS
A. The American Educational System and Parental Control
Education has always played a major role in American society. 4' When
schools were first established, little government involvement existed, leaving the
educational decisions to local schools and parents.4 2 However, as the country
developed, the government began to play an increasingly greater role in
education. '3 Government involvement has increased to the point that the public
school system has been likened to an "island of socialism in a free market
sea.""
39. A positive tax credit works to provide assistance in choosing a school to those who have
no taxable income and thus are not benefited by a tax deduction. When an individual's income is
below the taxable level, or when the taxable income is so small that the individual can not reap the
full benefit of a tax deduction, a positive tax credit will be issued to that person. With respect to
a voucher program, the positive tax credits are akin to the traditional "piece of paper voucher" and
should be redeemable only for educational services.
40. See infra section V.A.
41. See Kirkland, supra note 6, at 2-3 (noting that the American public education system has
played a larger role than any other institution in sustaining the United States' democratic government
and depriving Americans of an adequate education would "damage the very fiber of our nation and
produce a population ill-equipped to defend democracy"). The importance of education was seen
at the first convention of the American Federation of Labor in 1881 when the first issue addressed
was to pass a resolution that supported the public educational system. Id. at 3. Kirkland also notes
that success in the world marketplace depends on our commitment to education and a dedication to
improving the quality of the public educational system. Id. See also cases cited supra note 7 (citing
comments from the United States Supreme Court regarding the importance of education in society).
See generally Burton White, Education for Parenthood 1981, 163 J. EDUC. 205 (1981) (discussing
the importance of education in the early years of a child's development).
Further, while Milton Friedman views education as an integral part of the "American dream,"
he perceives public education as less than par. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 150-5 1. Friedman
argues that education is like any other market: the less competition, the lower quality of service is
provided at a higher cost. Id. at 152-58. As a partial solution to the educational problems in
America, Friedman proposes a plan that injects competition into the educational market thus allowing
parents to choose among many alternative sources of education for their children. Id. at 158-63.
42. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 150 (noting that at first the neighborhood school and control
by local school boards was the norm until a nationwide movement began, especially in the large
cities, which was sparked by the belief that professional educators should play a large role in
education).
43. For example, in 1852 the first compulsory attendance law was enacted in Massachusetts,
and by 1918 attendance was mandatory in all states. Id. at 150. See also E.G. West, The Political
Economy of American Public School Legislation, 10 J.L. & ECON. 101, 108 (1967) (outlining the
growth of government involvement in education); sources cited supra note 9.
44. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 154.
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A movement developed in the 1840s to replace the private schools that
educated the nation's children with "free" public schools, which would be
financed through taxes.' This movement was primarily led by teachers and
government officials, rather than by parents dissatisfied with the private school
system.' The establishment of government schools with compulsory
attendance laws47 reduced parental control over their children's education by
creating a public school monopoly over those parents who could not afford to
send their children to a private institution as well as pay taxes to support the
public school. 4  As a result, "the usual effects of monopoly occur: shoddy
products at a high cost to involuntary purchasers, [the taxpayers]."4 A system
that would allow parents and children to choose among schools would create
competition with nonpublic schools and force the waning public schools to
increase the quality of their service.'
Today, public education in the United States is provided through a
45. Id. at 153 ("The most famous crusader for free schools was Horace Mann. . . , the first
secretary of the Massachusetts State Board of Education established in 1837..., [who argued that]
education was so important that government had a duty to provide education to every child .... ").
46. See West, supra note 43, at 108. West notes that the first step in the campaign for "free
schools" came from the Onondaga County Teachers Institution in 1844. Id. The Institution cited
three reasons why a free school system should be favored. First, every human being has a right to
intellectual and moral educationand government has a corresponding duty to provide such education.
Id. Second, a free school system would prevent crime because of the free moral education. Id.
Finally, a free school system would benefit the lower class by developing their talents thereby
helping them to overcome the barrier of poverty. Id.
47. See supra note 43 (discussing mandatory attendance laws).
48. Van Den Haag, supra note 8, at 35. Van Deg Haag notes that the introduction of
competition, by the utilization of vouchers, may eliminate the worst effects of the public school
monopoly. Id.
49. Id. See also 3 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 160 (P.F. Collier & Son 1905). Upon noting the monopolistic features of public
education, Smith commented, "The endowment of schools and colleges have.., not only corrupted
the diligence of public teachers, but have rendered it almost impossible to have any good private
ones." Id.
50. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at ch.6 (arguing that the ability to choose among schools will
lead to an increase in educational quality); Van Den Haag, supra note 48, at 35 ("A voucher system,
entitling parents to choose any . . . school . . . would introduce some competition and might
eliminate the worst effects of the [public school] monopoly. "); Alan Reynolds, Al In Wonderland,
REASON, June 1992, at 49 (citing JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND
AMERICA'S SCHOOLS):
It should be apparent . . .that schools have no immutable or transcendent purpose.
What they are doing depends on who controls them and what those controllers want to
do." Schools controlled by unions and bureaucracies want, above all, to expand their
budgets and authority, while competitive schools would have no choice but to provide
what parents and students want, and [to] do so in a cost-efficient way.
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constitutional provision in each state's constitution.,' While the government
has continually poured more money into education, 52 governmental control of
schools has led to increased overstaffing53 and inefficiency' in the public
school systems. 5 As Milton Friedman noted,' e between 1968 and 1974 the
bureaucratization of the school system led to a fourteen percent increase in
teachers, fifteen percent increase in professional staff, and a forty-four percent
increase in supervisors for every one percent increase in the number of
students.5 However, the increasing size of the public school systems is not the
primary cause of the deteriorating quality of schools.' In fact, economies of
51. ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1;
ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; CONN. CONST.
art. VIII, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; GA. CONST. art. VIII, § V.
I; RAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1; IND. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. IX, 2d, § 3; KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 1; KY. CONST. § 183; LA.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; ME. CONST. art. VIII, Pt. 1, § 1; MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MASS. CONST.
Pt. 2, C. 5, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, §1; Miss. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 201; Mo. CONST. art. IX, § l(a); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1; NEm. CONST. art. VII, § 1; NEV.
CONST. art. XI, § 2; N.H. CoNsT. Pt. 2, art. 83; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § IV, 1; N.M. CONST.
art. XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(1); N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 2;
OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 5; OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONST. art.
IWI, § 14; R.I. CONST. art. XL, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. Xl, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; TENN.
CONST. art. XI, § 12; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. II,
§68; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2; W.VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1; WIS.
CONST. art. 10, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
52. Total U.S. spending on education rose from $24.7 billion in 1960, to $165.6 billion in
1980, and to $425 billion in 1992. Boaz, supra note 8, at 18. After accounting for inflation, per
pupil spending has increased approximately 35% over the past 10 years. Id.
53. See Rector, supra note 8, at 11 (citing that the New York City public school system
employs nearly 7000 bureaucrats for its approximate 900,000 students, a ratio of one bureaucrat for
every 155 students, while the New York City Catholic school system has fewer than 35 employees
in its central office, a ratio of one for every 4000 students).
54. Id. (noting that in 1989, only 32% of the funds allocated for students by New York City
actually reached the classroom; the remaining 68% fell into administrative and overhead costs of
the public education system).
55. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 154 (citing E.G. West, Education and the State (London:
The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1965)).
56. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 156 (citing Market Data Retrieval).
57. Id. at 155. The Theory of Bureaucratic Displacement developed by Dr. Max Gammon
which, in Dr. Gammon's words, states that "[in] a bureaucratic system ... increase in expendimre
will be matched by fal in production .... Such systems will act . . . like 'black holes' in the
economic universe, simultaneously sucking in resources, and shrinking in terms of 'emitted'
production." Id. at 155. This theory is equally applicable to the increasing bureaucratization and
centralization of the public school system. Id.
58. This is evident by observing that there are many large corporations in the marketplace that
are profitable and efficient. As noted by Friedman, "[t]he large size of General Motors has not
prevented it from flourishing." Id. at 156.
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scales could exist for large school systems if the consumers of education, the
students and parents, 6W were free to choose among competing schools.6'
Many leading scholars have proposed various methods of bringing
competition into the education market.' The resounding theme of all these
theories,' despite their distinct differences, is the concept of providing parents
and students with the power to choose the school of their choice. The voucher
concept, while enjoying considerable support, draws much controversy as a
means of increasing the quality of education.' Nonetheless, the concept is at
59. Economics of scale occur when the average total cost of producing a good or service
declines as output expands. HYMAN, supra note 12, at 237. Economies of scale are a result of
specialization and better utilization of available resources as the producing entity increases its
production and expands. Id. For schools, economies of scale would result when a school (or school
system) makes better use of its available resources and thus provides a better service, namely better
education at a lower cost.
60. Some argue that considering the student as the consumer of education is flawed reasoning
because education of an individual benefits all of society and placing the student in the role of
consumer obscures society's interest and stake in the transaction. Mary Anne Raywid, Public
Choice, Yes; Voucher, No!, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, June 1987, at 764. It is further claimed that
consuming education is unlike the consumption of an automobile where society has no real stake.
Id. This line of analysis is misguided because of the extreme position that must be taken to support
it. Just as society has an interest in one's education, society has an interest in one's purchase of an
automobile. Without an automobile, many individuals could not work or consume goods and
services. Clearly, working and the consumption of goods and services is in the public interest.
However, no one would say that the tree consumer of an automobile is too difficult to determine,
the same is true for education. Whatever externalities exist, the primary consumer and beneficiary
of education is the student.
61. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 156-57 ("If the consumer is free to choose, an enterprise
can grow in size only if it [provides a service] that the consumer prefers because of either its quality
or its price .... When the consumer is free to choose, size will survive only if it is efficient.").
62. See POLrTIcs, supra note 13 (citing a ten-year study of 500 schools which concludes that
the only way to improve the quality of education is to remove the bureaucracy and make the public
education system responsive to the demands of consumers); FAMILY CONTROL, supra note 13
(proposing a regulated voucher which would ensure against segregation); FRIEDMAN, supra note 6,
at ch. 6 (proposing an unregulated, market driven voucher); LA NOUE, supra note 3, at v:
There is no single voucher proposal. Some advocate vouchers that would be highly
regulated to avoid discrimination and inequality, whereas others urge unregulated
vouchers that would encourage the maximum variety of educational alternatives.
Similarly, compensatory vouchers that provide additional amounts for poor families are
supported by some, whereas others insist all families should receive equal amounts.
Id. See also LYTLE, supra note 9, at 22-23 (proposing the "Liberty School Plan" where vouchers
would be gradually phased into effect in order to help public schools prepare for competition among
schools). Only when parents are given greater control and the freedom to choose from among many
alternative schools will the quality of education improve. See POLITICS, supra note 13.
63. See infra notes 65-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the voucher concept.
64. See Steven K. Green, The Legal Argument Against Private School Choice, 62 U. CIN. L.
REV. 37, 37 (1993) (noting that school choice is at the forefront of the modern educational debate);
Kevin Banasik, Book Note, 31 HARv. J. ON LEOiS. 519, 519 (1994) (reviewing PETER W.
COOKSTON, JR., SCHOOL CHOICE: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF AMERICAN EDUCATION
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the forefront of the many theories proposed to improve the educational system.
B. The Voucher Concept
The concept of a voucher system is straightforward: make schools more
responsive to the demands of the consumer by returning greater control of the
child's education to the parents.' The state simply provides parents with the
ability to send their children to the school of their choice. Parents are provided
with this ability in the form of assistance in paying for educational expenses
incurred when sending their child to a nonpublic school." Empowering
parents and children with the ability to choose the school of their choice forces
the public schools, which now have an almost perfect monopoly power over
parents and children,' 7 to compete with nonpublic schools.' As Friedman
explains, "[t]he voucher plan embodies exactly the same principle as the GI bills
that provide educational benefits to military veterans. The veteran gets a
voucher only good for educational expenses' and is completely free to choose
the school at which he uses it . . . . " This type of system, implemented for
elementary and secondary education, will force schools to respond to consumer
demand and provide the type and quality of service that is desired.
As proposed by Milton Friedman,7 the state would provide the parents
(1994)) (noting that educational choice is the favored policy for remedying the failing American
educational system). See also supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text (supporting choice and
vouchers). Bur see supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text (opposing vouchers).
65. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 160.
66. Id. at 161.
67. It should be noted that the public school does not have monopoly power over those parents
and children who are fortunate enough to afford private school fees as well as taxes to support the
public school system.
68. Competition will occur with a federal income tax deduction because public schools generally
receive funding based on per pupil attendance at that school. L.S. Tellier, Annotation,
Determination of SchoolAuendance, Enrollment, or Pupil Populationfor Purposes ofApportionment
of Funds, 80 A.L.R. 2d. 953, 955 (1961); see also cases cited in infra note 276. While a federal
income tax deduction will not stop the state from continually funding even the most inefficient, low
quality public schools, the flow of students out of the below par schools will result in less funding
being allocated to that school. This will have virtually the same effect as if the state only funded
public schools in proportion to the amount of vouchers that school can attract.
69. By allowing the use of a voucher only for approved educational expenses either in the form
of an actual piece of paper or in the form of a tax deduction, the possibility of misuse of the
vouchers for noneducational goods or services will greatly decrease. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at
165.
70. Id. at 161. The G.I. Bill was enacted after World War II under the title of the
Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944. LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE
METROPOLITAN EXPERIENCE 250 (1988). While initially enacted for the purpose of easing the
effects of the demobilization of the economy after the War, the Readjustment Act marked the turning
point of the dramatic increase in popularity of higher education. Id. at 250-51.
71. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 6.
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of school children with a piece of paper, redeemable for a certain amount if, and
only if, it is used to pay for the cost of education.' The amount of the
voucher would be determined by the state and could reflect the approximate cost
to the state of educating that child, or a lesser amount that would provide a
savings to the state.' Parents could use the voucher at any school of their
choice,74  including schools outside their district, city, or state. 75
Furthermore, the public school system would rely solely on the voucher to
finance its operations. Thus, if a school was unable to attract students, it would
cease to exist because of the lack of financing. Only schools that provide what
the consumer demands, quality and efficiency for example, would survive. The
market would also allow for new market-participants, motivated by profit, to
create new schools to meet the demands of the parents and students.
The unregulated voucher envisions a program where parents would have the
ability to "add-on" to the value of the voucher and send their children to a more
expensive school.76 Opponents have attacked this vision claiming it will lead
to greater differences in educational opportunities because low-income families
would be at a severe disadvantage to "add-on," while higher income families
72. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 161.
73. For example, where the cost of educating a child in the public school system is
approximately $6000, the state could value the voucher at the entire $6000. Id. However, the state
could set the value at a lower figure, $4000 for example, and save the state $2000 in educational
costs every time a parent opts to use the voucher in a nonpublic school. Id. The parents will alsobenefit because they would have the power, if they choose to use it, to send their child to a
nonpublic school. In any event, both sides can gain from such a process. Id. This type of process
will yield close to a Pareto optimal solution which is beat for all parties involved. The Pareto
condition is a situation in which it is impossible for all individuals to gain further from additional
exchange. HYMAN, supra note 12, at 612; RooER LxRoy MIuE, INTERMEDIATE
MICROECONoMIcs 454 (McGraw-Hill 1978).
74. Certain minimal standards would still be imposed on schools. Schools would have to meet
"certain minimal standards, such as the inclusion of a minimum common content in their programs,
much [like] restaurants [must] maintain minimum sanitary standards." MILTON FRIEDMAN,CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 89 (1962). This is illustrated by the fact that the educational programsfor veterans after World War U were structured to allow veteran's to choose among any school that
met certain minimal requirements. Id. at 89-90. See also infra note 281 (arguing that minimal
requirements will increase the quality of education).
75. FAMILY CONTROL, supra note 13, at 161. Advantages would be created by allowing the
choice of schools to extend beyond the immediate school district, especially for urban families. Id.Furthermore, the larger area provides for a better opportunity for children of similar interests toband together and form schools tailored to their similar needs and interests. Id.; FRIEDMAN, supra
note 6, at 161 (noting that by not limiting the voucher to geographical or political boundaries it will
give parents greater control and provide for greater competition).
76. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 167. For example, if a voucher would be worth $1500,parents could "add-on" another $500 to send their child to a school that charges a tuition of $2000.
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could substantially add to the value of the voucher.' This "add-on" feature
causes some opponents to argue that vouchers will result in racial segregation
and also leave some students behind in poorly funded schools.' Undoubtedly,
differences in schools will continue to exist as the forces of the market take
over. However, the quality of all education will rise so substantially that the
worst schools would still be better in absolute terms, even though they may still
lag behind in relative terms.'
When parents and children have a choice of schools to patronize, economies
of scales° can exist for large public school systems as they do for private
enterprise." The size of the public school system will be dictated by consumer
choice. Such choice would be based upon whether parents and children opt to
take advantage of the services that the particular school is offering.' In
addition to the power to choose which school to attend, "the size of a public
school would be determined by the number of consumers it attracted, not by
politically defined geographical boundaries or by pupil assignment."' When
parents and children have the ability to choose the school that they will attend,
schools will begin to cater to students' needs. The market will dictate what type
of schools will exist and how many of them will survive." Some states, and
77. See FAMILY CONTROL, supra note 13, at 191.
Families unable to add extra dollars would patronize those schools that charged no
tuition above the voucher, while the wealthier families would be free to distribute
themselves among more expensive schools .... Both wealthier classmates and the
schools [that low-income families] might prefer to associate with would be foreclosed,
... all with the help of the state.
Id.
78. Allen, supra note 25, at 52. See also FAMILY CONTROL, supra note 13 (arguing that an
.add-on" feature would cause greater separation of the classes because low-income families, unlike
upper-income, will not be able to contribute additional money to the voucher).
79. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 170. Friedman concedes that some schools will remain
superior to others. Id. However, the structural change to the educational system will improve even
the worst schools. Id. Thus, while inequalities are inevitable, the end result is an improvement for
all schools.
80. See supra note 59 (explaining the concept of economies of scale).
81. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 156 (noting that General Motors' large size has not
impeded its growth & economic viability).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 163. The model legislation proposed by this note removes any state line barriers
from the choice of alternative schools which one may choose. See infra section W.A.
84. For example, some schools may specialize in a certain area of study such as mathematics,
science, or the arts. In New York's East Harlem District 4 there are twenty-four junior high
schools. Joan C. Szabo, Schools That Work, NATION'S Bus., Oct. 1991, at 23. Many of these
twenty-four schools are organized around a theme, such as the performing arts, computer science
and health and biomedical studies, while others operate as traditional junior high schools. Id. These
"specialty" schools are sometimes referred to as 'magnet schools" because they naturally attract
students who have the same interests. Magnet schools have been used as a tool to combat racial
segregation in certain school districts. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 54 (W.D. Mo.
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recently a White House proposal, have attempted to implement choice programs
and allow economies of scale to occur in the education market. These programs
and proposals will be discussed in the next Section.
C. Current and Proposed Choice and Voucher Programs
In May of 1991, the White House proposed a bill that would implement a
voucher program. " Then-President Bush and Education Secretary LamarAlexander introduced to Congress the America 2000 Excellence in Education
Act ("America 2 000").w America 2000 authorized $700.5 million for fiscal
year 1992 for several educational programs.' America 2000 would have also
allotted the Secretary of Education more latitude in federal spending for local
schools.ss The "parental choice" feature of America 2000 would have
permitted parents to select among public or private schools to send their
1985), aftd, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1034 (1989) (ordering that all
senior high school, middle schools, and half of the elementary schools be converted into magnet
schools in an effort to attract interested students from all over the district to the schools which would
cause a voluntary desegregation).
85. The bill was introduced in the House of Representatives by the following Representatives:Rep. Robert H. Michel (R-IL), Rep. William F. Goodling (R-PA), Rep. Carl D. Pursell (R-MI),and many others. 2 Cong. Index (CCII) 28,298 (May 23, 1991). The bill was introduced in theSenate by the following Senators: Sen. Claiborne Pell (D-RI), Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-UIT), Sen.Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS), Sen. Robert Dole (R-KS), Sen. Alan Simpson (R-WY), Sen. Jim Jeffords(R-VT), Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-SC), Sen. David Durenberger (R-MN), Sen. Thad Cochran (R-MS), Sen. Don Nickles (R-OK), Sen. Mark Hatfield (R-OR), Sen. Arlen Spector (R-PA), Sen.Robert Kasten (R-WS), Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN), Sen. Slade Gorton (R-WA), Sen. John Danforth(R-MO) and Sen. Ted Stevens (R-AK). 1 Cong. Index (CCH) 14,213 (May 23, 1991).86. H.R. 2460, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 1141, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The America2000 plan seems to be modeled after a British counterpart. Jill Smolowe, Britain's Brand of Choice,TIME, Sept. 16, 1991, at 60. The Education Reform Act, introduced in 1988 by Margaret Thatcher,
allows the $2550 per student annual allocation to follow the student to the school of their choice.Id. The Reform Act also allows local schools to "opt out" of the local system and receive fundingdirectly from the national government. Id. Upon opting out, the school's governing body, whichincludes parents, becomes responsible for running the school. Id. Since the overhead of the local
school system is no longer incurred after opting out, more funding can be allocated to books,facilities, and teachers. Id. Money which once went towards administrative costs is now used tohire additional teachers and update the school's labs. Id. The overall result of the Reform Act hasbeen to breathe new life into many schools that were on the verge of failure, as well as improve the
quality of education. Id.
87. Ziegler & Lederman, supra note 2, at 815. Specifically, the bill provided funding for: (1)$180 million for the creation of a "New American School" in each congressional district; (2) $100
million to make "Merit School" awards to public or private elementary or secondary schools whose
students demonstrated competence in the new national core curriculum; (3) teacher training andteacher recognition awards along with alternative certification for teachers and school principals;(4) $200 million for assistance for "parental choice" programs; and (5) a national core curriculum
consisting of English, mathematics, science, history and geography, as well as national standardized
tests to assess "educational progress." Id.
88. Id. See also S. 1411, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., Title V, Part A.
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children." Additionally, America 2000 would have provided financial support
to many parents, which in turn would have allowed them to make such a
choice.'
The proposed bill also allowed for grants to Local Education Agencies that
provided choice programs. 9  America 2000 would have authorized the
Secretary of Education to allot $30 million in grants to state and local education
authorities and to private educational institutions to operate "nationally
significant models of educational choice."' America 2000 was ultimately
defeated in the Senate and replaced by a bill" that forbade the use of federal
funds to help nonpublic educational institutions."
Several states have adopted choice systems of their own." For example,
in 1985, Minnesota developed a system of choice among public schools.'
Minnesota's program allows students in grades kindergarten through twelve to
choose their school regardless of district boundary lines, so long as racial
balances are not disrupted.' State revenue follows the students to the school
which they opt to attend.'
While Minnesota's efforts are a step in the right direction," much is left
unattended. For example, choice in Minnesota is limited to choice among public
89. H.R. 2460, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., Title V, Part A; (1991).
90. Id., Part B; S. 1411, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., Title V, Part B (1991); See also Ziegler &
Lederman, supra note 2, at 816.
91. H.R. 2460, 102d Cong., Ist Sess., Title V, Part B; S. 1411 l102d Cong., 1st Sess., Title
V, Part B (1991). See also Ziegler & Lederman, supra note 2, at 816.
92. H.R. 2460, 102d Cong., I st Sess., Title V, Part D; S. 1411, 102d Cong., I st Sess., Title
V, Part D (1991). See also Ziegler & Lederman, supra note 2, at 816.
93. This bill was sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass) and was adopted by the
Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee. Ziegler & Lederman, supra note 2, at 816. The
Kennedy bill eliminated the use of public funds for support of non-public education. Id. The Senate
also rejected an amendment which would have given low-income parents public funds to purchase
private education for their children. Id.
94. Id. at 816.
95. See Joe Nathan, More Public School Choice Can Mean More Learning, EDUC.
LEADERSHIP, Oct. 1989, at 51 (explaining that 40 states have school choice programs of some sort).
96. See Nancy Paulu, U.S. Dept. of Education, Improving Schools and Enpowering Parents:
Choice In American Education, Oct. 1991, at 3 (outlining the several states' choice programs).
97. Id. at 3. The Minnesota program requires that the racial balance be maintained in St. Paul,
Minneapolis and Duluth. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 59.
98. Paulu, supra note 96, at 4.
99. Minnesota has attempted to put some control back into the hands of the parents and students
by allowing students to choose their school. While the state has not gone far enough in this author's
opinion to inject competition back into the market for education, the state has taken a novel step
towards improving its educational system. See also H.R. 2460, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(2)
(1991) (finding that educational reform in the 1980s was too slow and too timid).
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schools." 3  This leaves public schools to face competition only from other
public schools. Also, while a public school cannot prohibit a student from
leaving its district for another, the schools are not required to accept students
from outside its district."0 ' Furthermore, limiting choice only to public
schools lessens the impact of competition on public schools because the schools
will only feel the pressure of competition from those districts that accept
students from outside the district. The full beneficial effect of a choice program
will only be felt when parents and children are truly free to choose among all
alternative schools, not simply public alternatives.
Despite strong opposition,0" a second state, Wisconsin, enacted the
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program in 1990.03 While the program is only
experimental,'" the legislation allows up to 1000 low-income family students
to receive tuition vouchers valued at $2500."'s In order to participate in the
program, the family's income must be at least 175% below the federal poverty
line."°  Although the Parental Choice Program allows parents to choose
100. Paulu, supra note 96, at 3.
101. Id. at 4. Allowing school districts to reject students from other districts decreases the
alternative choices that are available to parents. This decrease in choice results in less competition.
Reduced competition leads to fewer and slower improvements in public school education because
it reduces the force of the marketplace.
102. The opposition came from the State Department of Public Instruction and state teachers
unions. See James B. Egle, The Constitutional Implications of School Choice, 1992 WIS. L. REV.
459, 471. The opposition argued that despite the loss of students due to parental choice, the fixed
costs remained the same. Id. The opposition also argued that the funds lost due to parental choice
impaired the Milwaukee schools' ability to improve the quality of education, the ultimate goal of any
choice program. Id. Finally, the opposition claimed that the program would cause the talented
students to seek education elsewhere, leaving the Milwaukee public schools with many students with
special education needs and with less funding to meet those needs. Id.
103. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (West 1989-90). This legislation came after 20 years of
consideration of various choice programs. See Egle supra note 102, at 469 n.68 (outlining the
various bills that were proposed to the Wisconsin legislature but ultimately rejected).
104. See Egle, supra note 102, at 471 n.78 (citing that Governor Thompson stated that he has
no immediate plans to expand the program because he wants to test the program) (citing Thompson
Wants to Test Choice Program, MtLw. J., Aug. 10, 1990, at A8).
105. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (West 1989-90). See also Egle, supra note 102, at 470 n.71(explaining that the program's enrollment is capped at 1000 because § 119.23(2)(b)(1) allows a
maximum of 1% of the school district's 100,000 students to participate in the program).
106. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23(2)(a)(1) (West 1989-90). See also Egle, supra note 102, at470 n.72 (noting that a family of four would qualify if its monthly income was at or below $1853)(citing WISCONSIN DEP'T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, A BACKGROUND PAPER ON PRIVATE SCHOOL
CHOICE (1990)). The poverty line is set at three times the cost of the "economy food plan" for a
family of three or more. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPr. OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. P-60-185,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, POVERTY IN THE U.S.: 1992 at A-7. The "economy food plan'
is the least costly of four nutritionally adequate food plans designed by the Department of
Agriculture. Id. In 1994, the primary estimate of the poverty threshold for a family of four was
$15,141. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE (1994).
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private schools, it is strictly limited to nonsectarian schools.tr 7 Moreover, as
with any valid program, the participating schools must also guarantee
nondiscrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin.
m
The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program is a hybrid of the mainstream
choice programs rather than a mirror image of any one particular proposal."
m
While the size of the Milwaukee program will limit its effectiveness, the
program is a step in the right direction. The Milwaukee Parental Choice
Program has laid the groundwork for a more comprehensive, state-wide
program. In fact, a state-wide voucher program was proposed in California.
The California plan was an attempt to give parents greater choice among
alternative schools. On November 2, 1993, California citizens voted on the
Parental Choice in Education Initiative ("Proposition 174").t' By state
constitutional amendment, Proposition 174 would have allowed parents to choose
107. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23(2)(b) (West 1989-90). The participating school administrator
must guarantee that: "[t]he school is a nonsectarian school, that it does not include a pervasively
religious curriculum and it is not sponsored, administered, or funded by any religious group or
organization." WISCONSIN DEP'T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, MILWAUKEE PARENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM
NOTICE OF SCHOOL'S INTENT TO PARTICIPATE (1990), cited in Egle, supra note 102, at 470 n.70.
108. Wis. STAT. ANN. 119.23(2)(a)(4) (West 1989-90). The schools must also comply with
other requirements such as: participation in a Pupil Assignment Counsel, id. § 119.23(8); notifying
applicants of application decisions within 60 days and in writing, id. §§ 119.23(2)(b), 119.23(3);
providing proof of pupil enrollment, id. § 119.23(6); enrollment counts on a biannual basis, id. §
I 19.23(5)(a); academic, attendance, discipline, and parental involvement records are required to be
submitted to the State Department of Public Instruction, id. §§ 119.23(5)(a), 119.23(7)(b); and
compliance guarantee of the private school provisions in Wisconsin law, id. §§ 119.23, 118.165(c),
118.165(d).
109. See Egle, supra note 102, at 471. The Milwaukee program adopts a random selection
procedure in determining admissions to the program. Id. This methodology has been advanced by
the choice proposal created by Coons & Sugarman. Id. Furthermore, as proposed by Moe &
Chubb, the program leaves curricula decisions to the school. Id. However, as required by WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 119.23(2)(b) (West 1989-90), the Milwaukee schools must ensure that the curricula
are nonsectarian. See supra note 107 (discussing the standard that the participating school's
administrator must comply with). The open market theory advocated by Friedman has not played
a significant role in the Milwaukee program. Egle, supra note 102, at 471. Since the program
limits choice to other public or private-nonsectarian schools and since only a small portion of
students are able to participate, the market forces will have little effect. Furthermore, new schools
have not emerged to take advantage of the program and thus increased competition among the
schools exists, as many voucher advocates claimed would occur. Id. at 471 n.79. This should not
be a surprising result in Milwaukee. Since the program is limited to only 1000 students, there may
not be sufficient incentive to create a new school. Moreover, the program is only experimental
which may explain why many are hesitant to enter the market.
110. Michael Barone, School Choice: Its Tme Has Come, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct.
18, 1993, at 57.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 [1995], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol29/iss2/9
1995] EDUCATIONAL VOUCHERS 1023
their child's school by providing them with a $2600 voucher.. redeemable at
any qualified public, private, or sectarian school." 2 Proposition 174 was
ultimately defeated, having received only thirty percent of the vote."113
Opponents of Proposition 174 claimed that funds paid to parents of children
already in private institutions would destroy the state's education budget and
violate the United States Constitution."4 The opposition also opined that such
a program, which allows state funds to be channeled to sectarian schools,
violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.'" However, it is
unlikely that a properly drafted program would offend the Establishment
Clause." 6
An effective voucher program must allow full parental choice among all
viable alternatives, including the choice to attend a sectarian school.
Importantly, studies have shown that sectarian institutions provide a higher
quality of education than its public counterparts." 7 This resource of quality
education cannot be ignored. Competition and quality will be increased when
parents and students have more options available to them. Beyond merely
increasing the pool of available alternatives, including sectarian institutions
within a voucher program will yield a faster and greater increase in the quality
of all education. Also, the higher quality of education generally found in
sectarian institutions will tend to improve the quality of the public schools forced
to compete with them. To exclude sectarian institutions from an educational
voucher program will only retard the improvement of the educational system by
111. California spends approximately $5 100 per pupil annually. The Price of Choice, supra
note 22, at 25. Thus, every time a parent opts to use the voucher at a nonpublic school, the state
will save approximately $2500 while at the same time give parents greater power to control their
children's education.
112. Mark P. Petracca, Californians Weigh School-Choice System, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Oct. 4, 1993, at 19.
113. USA TODAY, Nov. 4, 1993, at 4A. The failure of Proposition 174 is puzzling because
a poll by Stanford University and Berkeley found that 63 % of Californians favored vouchers. The
Price of Choice, supra note 22, at 25. The answer may lie in the fact that the California Teacher
Association, which represents 90% of California's 250,000 public school teachers, had raised over$10 million to fight such a program. Id.; Choice Politics, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1993, at AI0.
114. Armstrong, supra note 20, at 34. The rational for the budgetary argument is that the state
should not subsidize a cost that parents are willing to incur without state assistance.
115. See id. (arguing that state aid to a religious institution will violate the wall of separation
between church and state). But see Allen, supra note 21, at 49 (arguing that such a choice program
would not violate modem establishment clause jurisprudence).
116. See infra notes 181-85, 204-10 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of a
facially neutral program, which effects a broad class of beneficiaries that aids sectarian schools only
as a result of private choice).
117. Peter M. Flanigan, A School System Tha Works, WALL ST. I., Feb. 12, 1991, at A14
(noting that over their high school career, Catholic students gain at least one year of academic
performance over students in public high schools). See also Coleman, supra note 19.
Kramer: Vouching for Federal Education Choice: If You Pay Them, They Will
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1995
1024 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29
shielding the lower quality schools from the schools that have achieved a high
level of quality.
Undoubtedly, any program that includes within its framework assistance to
support the choice to attend a sectarian school is certain to be challenged under
the Establishment Clause."" However, modem establishment clause
jurisprudence indicates that the United States Supreme Court will sustain such
a voucher system, provided the program is carefully drafted to meet certain
criteria. "" A choice through voucher program may also face challenges under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."2 The following
Section of this Note addresses the constitutional issues that are likely to confront
a voucher program.
118. The potential for challenge is evidenced by the many challenges to government aid to
religious schools. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993) (challenging
the provision of a sign-language interpreter by the state to a student attending a Catholic high
school); Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (challenging the
denial of financial vocational assistance by the state to a student who was pursuing a Bible studies
degree at a Christian college); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (challenging New York's use
of federal funds to finance programs which involved sending public school teachers into religious
schools to provide remedial instruction); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (challenging a
Minnesota statute that allowed a tax deduction for parents for expenses incurred in sending their
children to parochial schools); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646 (1980) (challenging a New York statute authorizing the use of public funds to reimburse church-
sponsored and secular nonpublic schools for performing various testing and reporting services
mandated by state law); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (challenging an Ohio statute which
authorized public funds to be used to purchase instructional materials and equipment for sectarian
schools); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (challenging the loan of textbooks and
instructional equipment to sectarian schools); Committee for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (challenging tuition reimbursements to parents whose children
attended nonpublic schools); Sloan v. Lemon. 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (challenging a Pennsylvania
statute providing for reimbursement of tuition paid by parents who send their children to nonpublic
schools); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1973) (challenging attempts by Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island to directly subsidize the salaries of teachers at nonpublic schools where 95 % of the
students attending nonpublic schools were enrolled in a sectarian school); Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236 (1968) (challenging a New York statute requiring school districts to purchase and loan
textbooks to students enrolled in a parochial schools); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)
(challenging the use of public funds to purchase textbooks and other instructional materials for use
in parochial schools); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (challenging the practice of
reimbursing parents for the transportation costs of sending their children to both public and parochial
schools). Q. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994)
(challenging New York's creation of a Hasidic Jewish village into a separate school district).
119. See infra notes 182-85, 204-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of these criteria.
120. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states, "No State shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the lais." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS TO EDUCATIONAL
VOUCHER PROGRAMS
Undoubtedly, a voucher program will face opposition on a constitutionallevel.'' This Section addresses the two areas of constitutional law under
which a voucher program will likely be challenged: the Establishment Clause
and the Equal Protection Clause. As this Section will illustrate,"= neither of
these two areas of constitutional jurisprudence will be an effective barrier to
properly drafted voucher legislation." However, because this Note proposesfederal legislation to improve the public educational system, the preliminary
issue of state sovereignty must be briefly addressed.
Some opponents may view a federal voucher program as a violation of theTenth Amendment," rendering Congress without power to enact any suchlegislation. The Tenth Amendment has undergone dramatic changes and hasbeen subjected to a wide range of interpretations." While education may be
121. See supra notes 30, 118 and accompanying text.
122. See infra sections HI.A. & B.
123. See infra section IV.A. for proposed legislation that would effectively overcome any
constitutional challenge.
124. The Tenth Amendment states: "The powers not delegated to the United States by theConstitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
125. Until 1985, the prevailing view of the Tenth Amendment's effect on Congress' power wasthat Congress could not interfere in the areas of traditional governmental functions of the states.National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (emphasis added). Thus, the role of thejudiciary in determining if state sovereignty had been encroached was to determine whether aparticular activity was a traditional governmental function of the state. Under the National League
of Cities approach, it is likely that a federal voucher plan would be viewed as a violation of state
sovereignty because education would be viewed as a traditional governmental function of the statesince every state individually provides and has traditionally provided for its own public education.
See supra note 51. The Court's view of the Tenth Amendment in National League of Cities was
changed in 1985. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
In Garcia, a case dealing with the applicability of the Fair Labor Standards Act to a state
owned and operated transit authority, the Court expressly overruled National League of Cities. 469U.S. at 557 (1985). In effect, Garcia removed any tenth amendment barriers that may have existed
to Congress' power. After reasoning that an analysis of the Tenth Amendment that turns on whether
an activity is "traditional" or "integral" is unworkable, the Court explained that the only limit thatthe Tenth Amendment places on Congress' power is the inherent limits of the political system. Id.
at 547. The Court reasoned that the federal government is structured in such a way so as to protect
state sovereignty. Id. at 552. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted several features of thefederal system of government: each state is guaranteed two senators, states have control over
electoral qualifications for federal elections, and states play an important role in presidential elections
through the Electoral College. Id. at 551. Garcia stands for the proposition that the inherent limits
on federal power over the states through a properly working political system is the only limit theTenth Amendment places on Congress. Thus, Garcia reduced the role of the judiciary, indetermining whether the Tenth Amendment has been violated, to merely deciding if the political
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viewed as a traditional state activity, since Congress, acting under its Commerce
Clause power as well as its spending power, will not commandeer state
governments for the implementation of voucher legislation, a federal choice
through voucher program will not implicate the Tenth 
Amendment.1 6
However, voucher legislation, once enacted, will face other constitutional
challenges.
A. The Establishment Clause: The Wall Is Not Too High
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution states, "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment
process is working correctly, a virtually meaningless inquiry.
Six years after Garcia, the Court, in Gregory v. Ashcrofl, once again spoke to the issue of
state sovereignty in deciding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not apply to a
Missouri constitutional provision mandating the retirement of state judges at age 70. 501 U.S. 452
(1991). In Gregory, the Court delineated its Plain Statement Rule. Id. The Court held that
Congress must clearly state when it intends to upset the normal balance of power between the federal
government and the states. Id. This rule was an attempt to ensure that the states, as represented in
Congress, know what they are enacting, thereby preventing the breakdown of the political process.
Id. at 463. The Ashcrofl decision compliments Garcia's approach on the limits that the Tenth
Amendment imposes on Congress by creating a doctrine which will ensure a proper political process
and necessarily less judicial involvement.
After Garcia, the Tenth Amendment seemed to impose no actual barrier to Congress at all.
However, the Court breathed new life into the Tenth Amendment only one year after Ashcroft. See
New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). In New Yor*, Congress passed legislation, the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, that required states to either provide
for disposal of radioactive waste generated within their borders or take title to that waste. Id. at
2415-16. The Court found that the "take title" provision of the Act was constitutionally deficient.
Id. at 2427-28. The Court held that when there is an interest which is sufficiently compelling to
cause Congress to legislate, it must do so directly, and may not commandeer the state government.
Id. at 2428. In effect, the Court held, that while Congress may preempt the states in a particular
subject matter, Congress does not have the power to require states to legislate.
Thus, it appears that Ashcroft, by requiring a clear statement of intent from Congress when
upsetting the normal balance of federalism, and New York, by holding that Congress can not require
states to legislate, puts new life into the Tenth Amendment and places a limit on the Garcia approach
to the Tenth Amendment. However, Garcia can be distinguished from New York on the basis that
Garcia dealt with a generally applicable piece of legislation, the Fair Labor Standards Act, while
New York dealt with federal legislation aimed solely at the state, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Amendments Act of 1985. In sum, the Tenth Amendment has undergone considerable change
and currently does not present an effective barrier to congressional power.
126. A federal voucher program, as proposed by this note, will not violate the principles of the
Tenth Amendment. The model legislation neither requires state governments to legislate, as agents
of Congress, nor is the legislation unclear as to its intent. Assuming a properly working political
process, the Court will not intervene to invalidate this legislation as a violation of state sovereignty.
Thus, under the principles set forth in Garcia, Ashcrofl, and New York, the proposed voucher
legislation will not fal victim to the Tenth Amendment.
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of religion 
."7 While the First Amendment applies directly to the
federal government, it is applied to the states through the selective incorporation
doctrine of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But for
a voucher program's inclusion of sectarian schools, the Establishment Clause
would not be an issue."2 Many of the proposed voucher schemes, including
that proposed by this Note, include sectarian schools within their
framework," thus bringing the Establishment Clause into consideration.
Determining when the federal or state government has violated the Establishment
127. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Not until after 1947 did the Supreme Court seriously address theEstablishment Clause. Wi.iAM B. LocKART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1091 (7th ed. 1991).Only two cases prior to that time produced any significant establishment clause analysis. See Quick
Bear v. Luepp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908) (upholding the disbursement of federal funds to Catholic schoolsfor tuition costs for the Sioux Indians); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (allowing federal
appropriations for construction costs and care for indigent patients at a Catholic hospital).
128. See Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389 (1985) (invalidating a schooldistrict's shared time program under the Establishment Clause); Committee for Pub. Educ. v.Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (concluding that a New York law providing income tax benefits to
parents of children attending nonpublic schools violates the Establishment Clause); Walz v. TaxComm., 397 U.S. 664, 666-67 (1970) (challenging the constitutionality, under the Establishment
Clause, of a New York City property tax exemption for religious organizations for property used
solely for religious purposes); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943) (noting explicitly
that the First Amendment was made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) (challenging the state transportation of pupils to
both public and parochial schools).
Originally, the Bill of Rights was not applicable to the activities of the state and localgovernments. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 382 (4th ed. 1991).
However, the selective incorporation doctrine incorporates specific provisions of the Bill of Rightsinto the Fourteenth Amendment and provides "protections against the states exactly congruent with
those [protections] against the federal government." 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constituional Law § 453(1979). Modern jurisprudence demonstrates that virtually all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights
have been selectively incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and made
applicable to the states. TRIBE, supra, at 385. When determining whether a provision should beincorporated into the Due Process Clause, the Court asks whether the guarantee is fundamental to
the American scheme of justice. Id. Thus, the Court seems to be willing to enforce rights whichit views as having a special importance in the development of individual liberty in American society.
Id.
129. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment protects religious liberty and prohibits
the government from making laws 'respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend.I. If the government implements a voucher program that in no way involves a religious entity, no
threat of the government establishing a religion would exist and therefore no Establishment Clauseissue would be presented. Furthermore, excluding sectarian schools from a voucher plan would not
offend the Free Exercise Clause because the initial step of demonstrating governmental action which
substantially interferes with religion could not be established. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n., 480 U.S.136 (1987). Since people
could not claim that their religious beliefs require receipt of educational vouchers, the Free Exercise
Clause is not implicated.
130. See supra section ll.B. & C., notes 65-120 and accompanying text.
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Clause can be a difficult task.'3' Establishment clause jurisprudence can be
as perplexing as the M.C. Esher print,'32  The Waterfall.133  However,
several factors have emerged that help to determine when the line separating
church and state has been impermissibly crossed.134
This Section begins by exploring the Lemon test as applied by the Court in
cases dealing with government funding of sectarian schools. 35 Next, this
Section analyzes establishment clause jurisprudence in light of the recent
decision in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District" and its effect on the
validity of educational vouchers.'37 Finally, this Section briefly explores other
tests employed by the Court in addressing the Establishment Clause,s
including Justice O'Conner's endorsement test and the "neutrality" test recently
employed by the Court. However, any examination of the Establishment Clause
must begin with the Lemon test.
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,"" the Court created a three-part test for
determining when an Establishment Clause violation has occurred. Despite the
Court's heavy reliance on Lemon, this test has been characterized as only a
131. See Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 485 (1986) ("The
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment has consistently presented this Court with difficult
questions of interpretation and application . . . . We can only dimly perceive the lines of
demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law."); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388, 393 (1983) ('It is not at all easy, however, to apply this Court's various decisions construing
the [Establishment] Clause . . . . "); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262 (1977)(Powell, I.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Our decisions in this troubling area draw lines that often
must seem arbitrary."); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
761 N.5 (1973) ("[T]he Court has recognized its inability to perceive with invariable clarity the
'lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law.'").
132. Maurits Cornelis Esher was a graphic artist born June 17, 1898 in Leeuwarden.
BENEDiKT TAsCHEN, M.C. ESH.R THE GRAPHIC WORK 16 (1992).
133. The print depicts water continually falling over a millwheel and then impossibly flowing
back "up" to the water's point of decent over the millwheel. Id. at 76. The two towers, which
make up the waterfall, are the same height and yet the tower from which the water falls onto the
millwheel is impossibly a story higher than the tower from which the water flows. Id. at 16, 76.
As described by M.C. Esher, the watertower "is composed of square beams which rest upon each
other at ight angles. If we follow the various parts of this construction. . . we are unable to
discover any mistake in it. Yet it is an impossible whole because changes suddenly occur in the
interpretation of distance between our eye and the object." Id. at 16.
134. See infra text accompanying notes 181-85, 204-10.
135 See infra notes 139-91 and accompanying text.
136. 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
137. See infra notes 192-214 and accompanying text.
138. See infra notes 215-28 and accompanying text.
139. 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (invalidating attempts by Pennsylvania and Rhode Island to directly
subsidize the salaries of teachers at nonpublic schools where 95 % of the students attending nonpublic
schools were enrolled in a sectarian school).
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"helpful signpost" in dealing with establishment clause challenges," and in
the Court's most recent decisions it has been greatly ignored. 4' Nonetheless,
Lemon has not been overturned or replaced by an alternative test, and thus it
continues to govern establishment clause challenges.
The three-part test initially requires that the government action have some
secular legislative purpose. 42 Generally, this prong is of little importance
because of the considerable deference given to federal and state legislatures. 43
The legislative purpose must be "motivated wholly by an impermissible
purpose" to fail the secular purpose prong of Lemon.'" The second prong of
the test requires that the principle or primary effect of the government action be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion.4 The Court has delineated
several factors that it will look to when deciding this prong of the Lemon
analysis.'" Finally, the government action must not foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion. '47
Not satisfied with the traditional Lemon test, the Supreme Court in recent
140. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983).
141. See cases cited infra note 148.
142. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
143. Carl H. Esbeck, The Lemon Test: Should It Be Retained, Reformulated or Rejected?, 4NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 513, 518 (1990) ("This highly deferential approach canbe seen in the Supreme Court's parochial aid cases."); Amy Christine Hevly, Note, Nothing Simple
or Certain: Establishment Clause Barriers to Choice Systems in American Education, 35 ARIZ. L.REV. 467, 479 (1993) ("The first prong of the test ...is generally applied with considerabledeference to state legislatures."); Joel T. Ireland, Note, The Transfiguration of the Lemon Test:Church and State Reign Supreme in Bowen v. Kendrick, 32 ARIz. L. REv. 365, 385 (1990) ("TheCourt has shown great deference to legislatures in their statement of secular purpose.").
144. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602 (1988) (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668(1984) and Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980), the Court stated, "Under the Lemon standard.
a court may invalidate a statute only if it is motivated wholly by an impermissible purpose...
145. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
146. See infra text accompanying notes 181-85, 204-10.
147. Lemon, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The concept of the excessive entanglement-political
divisiveness test was first introduced in Board ofEduc. v. Allen by Justice Harlan. JOHN E. NOWAK& RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1192 (4th ed. 1991). A clear example of an
excessive government entanglement with religion was seen in Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc. 459U.S. 116 (1982). In Larkin, a zoning law which granted all churches or schools the power to veto
the issuance of a liquor license for property within 500 feet of the church or school was held to be
unconstitutional. Id. See also Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S.Ct. 2481, 2487 (1994) (relying on Larkin to invalidate an attempt by New York to delegate to an
Hasidic Jewish village the powers of a school district).
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decisions'" has completely side-stepped its analysis.
49 Some members of
the Supreme Court have advocated other tests for establishment clause
challenges. Justice O'Connor has proposed that the Court inquire whether the
objective observer" would perceive the government action as an endorsement
of religion,"' while Justice Kennedy would focus attention on whether the
government has coerced anyone to support or participate in religion.1
52
Educational voucher programs would have little difficulty passing Justice
Kennedy's coercion analysis because none of the proposed programs coerces an
individual, even subtly, to participate in or support religion. 
53  While new
148. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2498,
& 2500 (1994) (O'Connor, L., concurring) (noting that the focus of the Court was not on the Lemon
test and commenting that the Court has begun to move away from the three-part test); Id. at 2515
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (commenting that although the three lower courts relied on Lemon, as well
as eighty pages of briefing by the parties, the Court refused to rely on the test, giving it only two
"see also" references); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993) (concluding,
without applying the three-prong Lemon analysis, that the Establishment Clause does not prevent a
school district from providing a deaf student attending a religious school with a sign-language
interpreter).
149. As noted by William Bently Bali, who represented Jimmy Zobrest before the Supreme
Court, "The Court, it is true, did not overrule Lemon. It simply bypassed Lemon." William Bently
Ball, One Student's Struggle, CHRISTIAN LBoAL SOC'Y. Q., Fall 1993, at 15 (emphasis in original).
150. It is not entirely clear' who the objective observer is or what characteristics this mythical
person possesses. See William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It," The Supreme Court And
Establishment, 59 So. CAL. L. REv. 495, 537 (1986) ("Is the objective observer ... a religious
person, an agnostic, a separationist, a person sharing the predominate religious sensibility of the
community, or one holding a minority view? Is there any 'correct' perception?"). But see Note,
Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1648 (1987) ("If the Establishment Clause is to
prohibit government from sending a message to religious minorities or nonadherents that the state
favors certain beliefs and that as nonadherents they are not fully members of the political
community, its application must turn on the message received by the minority or nonadherent.")
(emphasis in original).
151. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). There seems
to be a fairly significantly overlap between Justice O'Connor's Endorsement Test and the Lemon
Test's primary effects prong. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 147, at 1162 n.l. (citing County
of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 590-93 (1989); Board of Educ. of Westside Community Sch.
v. Mergena, 496 U.S. 226, 247 253 (1990)).
152. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy commented:
Our cases disclose two limiting principles: government may not coerce anyone to
support or participate in any religion or its exercise; and it may not, in the guise of
avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a degree
that it in fact 'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.' These
two principles, while distinct, are not unrelated, for it would be difficult indeed to
establish a religion without some measure of more or less subtle coercion.
Id.
153. Choice and voucher programs, like that proposed by this note, provide for no incentive
or penalty respecting the parent's and child's choice to attend a public, private-secular, or private-
sectarian school. Therefore, a coercion analysis will not be the constitutional downfall of this choice
through voucher proposal because there is no form of coercion present.
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tests have emerged, the Lemon test has yet to be permanently laid to rest by the
Court' 54 and remains a crucial inquiry for an establishment clause challenge.
Because educational voucher plans that include sectarian institutions raise
potential establishment clause problems,"5 such programs should be tested
under Lemon's three-part analysis. " Furthermore, to address Justice
O'Connor's concerns, such a program must not send a message that government
is endorsing religion.'57 Various decisions suggest that the Court would most
likely approve of such a voucher scheme. " However, the Court has not
always implied its approval of a voucher plan that includes sectarian schools.
In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,' the
Court held invalid a New York law that sought to provide, among other things,
tuition reimbursements to parents." The Court, in applying the Lemon test,
found no violation of the secular purpose prong," but concluded that the law
had the primary effect of advancing religion."6  The Court reasoned that
because the state paid the tuition reimbursement directly to the parents, rather
than to the school, the tuition reimbursement law violated the primary effects
prong of Lemon."6 The Court has since changed its view towards the direct
154. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist. 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2149(1993) (Scalia J., concurring) ("As to the Court's invocation of the Lemon test: Like some ghoul
in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being
repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks the Establishment Clause jurisprudence.., frightening
the little children and ... attorneys. .. ").
155. See cases cited supra note 118.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 139-47.
157. See infra notes 216-28 and accompanying text.
158. See infra notes 166-228 and accompanying text.
159. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
160. Approximately 20% of all students attended over 2000 nonpublic schools, approximately
85% of which are church affiliated. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 768 (1973). Parents whose annual taxable income was less than $5000 were entitled to
a tuition reimbursement of $50 for each grade school child and $100 for each high school child.
Id. at 764. For those parents who failed to qualify for tuition reimbursements, a state tax deduction
was allowed for as much as $1000 per dependant for a taxpayer with an adjusted gross income of
less than $9000, to zero deductions allowed for taxpayers with an adjusted gross income of $25,000
or more. Id. at 765-66.
161. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 773 (noting that the law's legislative purposes of promoting diversity
among the schools and protecting the public school system from becoming overburdened by an
influx of children which have been serviced by private schools adequately supports legitimate,
nonsectarian state interests).
162. Id. at 779-80.
163. Id. at 783. The Court reasoned that while other secular purposes existed for the tuition
grants, the pervading purpose was to ensure that parents have the option to send their children to
sectarian schools. Id.
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payment of educational reimbursements to parents.'" After Nyquist, the
chance of any voucher program that included sectarian schools seemed to have
little hope of surviving an establishment clause challenge."
Ten years after Nyquist, the Court in Mueller v. Allen'" upheld'6 a
Minnesota statute" that allowed Minnesota taxpayers to deduct certain
expenses incurred in providing education for their children.'" Unlike the
Nyquist decision, the Court found importance in the fact that the aid was
provided to parents and not directly to the sectarian institution. The Mueller
decision removed a brick from the wall separating church and state, and
"cleared the way for an accommodation between church and state that more




164. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399 (1983) (noting that the direct payment to parents was
an important factor in concluding that the Minnesota tax benefit did not violate the Establishment
Clause). See also infra note 175 and accompanying text.
165. The probability of a voucher scheme, which includes sectarian schools, being held
unconstitutional after Nyquist was quite high. Nyquist invalidated a law that sought to partially and
directly reimburse parents for the cost of tuition, including tuition paid to sectarian schools. A
voucher program, which entails both of these features, would thus be struck down after Nyquist.
166. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
167. The Court was split five-to-four: Justices Burger, White, Powell, and O'Connor joined
in the majority opinion delivered by Justice Rehnquist while Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall,
and Stevens dissented in an opinion written by Justice Marshall.
Id. at 389.
168. MINN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982).
169. The statute provides:
Tuiton and transportation expense. The amount he has paid to others, not to exceed
$500 for each dependant in grades K to 6 and $700 for each dependant in grades 7 to
12, for tuition, textbooks and transportation of each dependant in attending an
elementary or secondary school situated in Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Iowa or Wisconsin, wherein a resident of this state may legally fulfill the state's
compulsory attendance laws, which is not operated for profit, and which adheres to the
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and chapter 363. As used in this subdivision,
'textbooks' shall mean and include books and other instructional materials and
equipment used in elementary and secondary schools in teaching only those subjects
legally and commonly taught in public elementary and secondary schools in this state
and shall not include instructional books and materials used in teaching religious tenets,
doctrines or worship, the purpose of which is to inculcate such tenants, doctrines or
worship, nor shall it include such books or materials for, or transportation to,
extracurricular activities including sporting events, musical or dramatic events, speech
activities, driver's education, or programs of a similar nature.
MINN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982)
170. The Religion Clause of the Constitution of the United States provides: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ..
U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
171. Thomas Patrick Monaghan& Michael S. Ariens. II, Mueller v. Allen: A Fairer Approach
To The Establishment Clause, 29 ST. Louis U. L.J. 115, 115 (1984).
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As opposed to the statute in Nyquist, the Minnesota law challenged in
Mueller"r did not restrict the use of the deduction to taxpayers whose
dependents attended nonsectarian schools. 3 The only restriction in the statute
with respect to sectarian institutions is that neither instructional materials used
in teaching religious tenets, nor materials or transportation to extracurricular
activities of sectarian institutions, are included as deductible expenses. 174
Thus, the state, through a facially neutral law and the private choice of the
parent and student in deciding to attend a sectarian school,"5 assisted the
parent and child in the costs associated with such attendance.
In sustaining the law, 76 the Court applied the three-part test established
in Lemon.'" The Court spent little time deciding that the statute had a secular
legislative purpose." The Court noted that governmental assistance programs
aimed at improving educational opportunities for students have consistently been
held to have a secular purpose. " 9 More specifically, the Court recognized
that "a state's efforts to assist parents in meeting the rising cost of educational
expenses plainly serves [a] secular purpose." I"
The Mueller decision focused on the primary effects prong of the Lemon
test. In deciding that the Minnesota statute neither advanced nor inhibited
religion, the Court cited several factors that were determinative in this
result.' 8' Most importantly, the deduction allowed by the law was available
to a broad class of beneficiaries."s  The Court reasoned that "the deduction
is available for educational expenses incurred by all parents, including those
172. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
173. See supra note 169 (quoting the Minnesota statute).
174. See supra note 169.
175. The Court found the private choice of the parent and child to attend a sectarian school,
rather than the state directly issuing payment of funds to the sectarian school to be an important
factor in upholding the statute. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399. This private choice is likewise found in
the model legislation proposed by this note.
176. See supra note 169.
177. See supra notes 137-47 and accompanying text (discussing Lemon's three-part test).
178. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983). The Court noted that it is reluctant,
especially when a plausible secular purpose may be discerned, to assign unconstitutional motives to
the states. Id. at 394-95.
179. Id. at 394 (citing Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)).
180. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 395. The Court noted that the consistency by which governmental
assistance programs pass the secular purpose prong reflects, at least in part, the Court's reluctance
to attribute unconstitutional motives to the states, particularly when a plausible secular purpose may
be gleaned from the text of the statute. Id. at 394-95.
181. See infra text accompanying notes 182-85.
182. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 397-98 (1983) (noting that the assistance program in
Mueller is different from that in Nyquist because the Minnesota assistance program is available to
all parents, not only those whose children attend non-public schools, like that in Nyquist).
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whose children attend public schools [as well as] those whose children attend
nonsectarian private schools or sectarian private schools."" The Court also
noted that the deduction allowed by the Minnesota tax laws was only one among
many deductions,'" and public funds only became available to sectarian
schools after the private choice of individual parents of school-age children."8
Thus, a voucher program that includes sectarian schools can survive the
primary effects prong of Lemon, provided that certain criteria are built into the
program. First, the voucher program must provide funds only on the basis of
a parental decision to enroll their children in a nonpublic school.' t Also, the
program must include a broad class of beneficiaries by making nonsectarian
private schools equally eligible for the vouchers."8 ' Further, the program must
in no way create a financial incentive to attend sectarian institutions.'
Turning to the third prong of the Lemon inquiry, the Mueller Court had no
difficulty deciding that the Minnesota law did not excessively entangle the state
with religion.' The Court reasoned that the only plausible source of
entanglement would come from state officials determining whether particular
textbooks would qualify for a deduction,'" but the Court in Board of
Education v. Allen'9' previously held that this posed no constitutional obstacle.
Thus, a voucher program in which the state plays a minimal role, only ensuring
that certain minimal standards are met, will not excessively entangle the state
with religion.
Evidence that the Court will sustain a properly drafted voucher program
183. Id. at 397.
184. Id. at 396. For example, Minnesota tax law also allows for deductions for charitable
contributions. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.21(3) (West 1993).
185. MueUer, 463 U.S. at 399. The Court rejected the Petitioner's argument that the statute,
despite its facial neutrality, primarily benefitted sectarian schools.
Petitioners cite[d] a "Revenue Analysis" prepared in 1976 by the Minnesota Department
of Revenue, which state(d] that "[o]nly those taxpayers having dependents in nonpublic
elementary or secondary schools are effected by the law since tuition, transportation and
textbook expenses for public school students are paid for by the school district."
Id. at 400 n.9. The majority stated, "Wle would be loath to adopt a rule grounding the
constitutionality of a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent to which various
classes of private citizens claimed benefits under the law." Id. at 401. It was further stated that the
attenuated financial benefit to sectarian schools, as a result of private choice from a neutrally
available tax deduction, is not within the historic purposes of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 400.
186. See Bolick, supra note 29, at 2 (providing a checklist for a successful educational choice
program that includes religiously affiliated schools); see also supra note 184 and accompanying text.
187. See Bolick, supra note 29 at 2. See also supra note 182 and accompanying text.
188. See Bolick supra note 29, at 2. See also supra note 182 and accompanying text.
189. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 (1983).
190. Id. at 403 (citing Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)).
191. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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may also be found in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District. " In
Zobrest, James Zobrest requested' 93 the Catalina Foothills School District to
provide a sign-language interpreter to accompany him to class at a Roman
Catholic high school." 9  After the school district refused to provide the
interpreter, James Zobrest instituted an action in United States District
Court.'95  The district court held that a state-provided interpreter, under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 96 would violate the
Establishment Clause because the interpreter would "act as a conduit for...
religious inculcation" and therefore was an impermissible entanglement of
church and state."9  By a divided vote, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court opinion after applying the Lemon test.'"
The Court of Appeals ruled that the IDEA, as applied, would have the primary
effect of advancing religion and thus violated the Establishment Clause.' 9
On October 5, 1992, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Zobrest.. The Court,"' on June 18, 1993, reversed the lower court's
192. 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
193. The request was made pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),
20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (1988), and the Arizona counterpart, ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-761
et seq. (1991 and Supp. 1992). Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2464
(1993). See also infra note 195.
194. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464.
195. Id. The action was premised on the theory that the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment required the school district to provide a
sign-language interpreter. Id. at 2464.
196. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (West 1988). This Act provides federal money to assist state
and local agencies in educating handicapped children. The Act conditions such funding upon a
state's compliance with extensive goals and procedures. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(1)-(7) (West 1988).
Among the many qualifications for federal assistance under the Act, a state must demonstrate that
it "has in effect a policy that assures all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate public
education." 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(1) (West 1988).
197. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464.
198. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1992).
199. Id. at 1196.
200. 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
201. Justices White, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion.
Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Souter and Stevens joined and Justice
O'Connorjoined in part. Justice O'Connor filed a separate dissent in which Justice Kennedy joined.
Some members of the Court concluded that the constitutional question should not be addressed
because of prudential concerns. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2469
(1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint ... that this Court
will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them .... That
'fundamental rule' suffices to dispose [this] case.. . . "). Justice Stevens joined Justice O'Connor's
dissent. Id. at 2475. Justices Souter, Stevens, and O'Connorjoined Justice Blackmun's dissenting
opinion, which first concluded that the Court should not have reached the constitutional question.
Id. at 2469. Justice Blackmun argued that the case could easily be disposed of by remanding it for
consideration of whether the IDEA provides an entitlement to services for students placed in private
Kramer: Vouching for Federal Education Choice: If You Pay Them, They Will
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1995
1036 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29
ruling and held that the Establishment Clause does not prevent a school district
from furnishing a disabled child, enrolled in a sectarian school, with a sign-
language interpreter.'
The Court did not mention Lemon in its establishment clause analysis.'
Side-stepping this traditional test, the Court instead focused on several features
of the assistance program that were similar to those in Mueller to support its
decision. First, the Court noted that the service was "part of a general
government program that distributes its benefits neutrally ... without regard to
the 'sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature' of the school the child
attends."' The Court concluded that handicapped children were the primary
beneficiaries under IDEA and that the sectarian schools were only incidental
beneficiaries to the extent that they benefitted at all.' Next, the Court
reasoned that IDEA created no incentive to attend a sectarian institution."
The governmental aid only reached a sectarian institution as a result of a private
choice by parents.' Further, the Court, in distinguishing Meek v.
Pittenger' and School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball,' reasoned that
providing a sign-language interpreter did not relieve the sectarian institution of
costs it otherwise would have borne in educating its students. 1 °
As the Mueller and Zobrest decisions illustrate, a governmental educational
assistance program that includes sectarian institutions will survive an
schools at their parents' option. Id. at 2470. However, Justice Blaekmun continued on to disagree
with the majority on the merits of the case, in which only Justice Souter joined. Id. at 2471-75.
202. Zobresi, 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
203. Id. at 2466-69 (concluding, without applying the traditional three-prong Lemon analysis,
that a state provided sign-language interpreter for a student attending a religious school did not
violate the Establishment Clause).
204. Id. at 2467. As in Zobrest, the Mueller Court found the neutrality of the program of
particular importance. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. The neutrality aspect appears
to be a pivotal factor in the Court's establishment clause jurisprudence. See also Board of Educ.
of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481,2494 (1994) (holding that New York's
attempt to create a new school district from an existing Hasidic Jewish village unconstitutional
because in doing so the state violated the principle of neutrality towards religion).
205. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist. 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2469 (1993).
206. Id. at 2467.
207. Id.
208. 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (striking down a statute that provided aid, in the form of a direct loan
of teaching equipment and material, to private schools, more than 75% of which were sectarian).
209. 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (declaring unconstitutional a scheme whereby public school teachers
were sent into sectarian schools to offer courses that were solely attended by students at those
sectarian schools).
210. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2469 (1993) (explaining that
supplemental state aid to a religious school is permissible, although attempts to supplant costs that
the religious school would have otherwise incurred is impermissible funding because the effect would
be to directiy subsidize the religious school).
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establishment clause challenge, provided that it includes certain features.
Specifically, the program must be facially neutral and apply to a broad class of
beneficiaries without regard to the sectarian-secular nature of the
beneficiaries.21' Further, the program should not relieve the sectarian
institution of costs that it otherwise would incur in educating its students." 2
A voucher program will clearly not relieve the sectarian school of any cost;
rather, the voucher will relieve the parents who opt to send their children to the
sectarian school of the burden of the school's fees.213 Although this may mean
more dollars flowing into sectarian institutions, this occurs solely as a result of
private choices.21 4  Therefore, a voucher that is given to parents and
redeemable at any qualified school will meet the required criteria necessary to
survive a first amendment challenge.
As noted earlier and as demonstrated by Zobrest, Grumet, and other
decisions, some members of the Court have become disenchanted with the
Lemon analysis2"' and have proposed new tests for establishment clause
challenges. These tests, if anything, propose a more accommodating approach
to church and state relations and thus make it more likely that voucher programs
will pass constitutional scrutiny. Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion
in Lynch v. Donnelly,216 articulated her endorsement test, which can be viewed
as a refinement of the primary effects prong of Lemon. 217  First, Justice
O'Connor stated that the Establishment Clause can be violated when the
government excessively entangles itself with religion.2 " Educational vouchers
are unlikely to fail under this analysis when the government involvement is kept
211. See supra text accompanying note 182.
212. See supra text accompanying note 210.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 185, 210.
214. See supra text accompanying note 185.
215. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.. 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2150
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing numerous opinions, Justice Scalia commented that "[olver the
years... no fewer than five of the currently sitting Justices have, in their own opinions, personally
driven pencils through the creature's heart, [referring to the Lemon test,] ... and a sixth has joined
an opinion doing so"). See also supra notes 148, 154 and accompanying text.
216. 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that a nativity scene displayed in a public park did not
violate the Establishment Clause as a constitutionally impermissible governmental display of a
religious symbol).
217. Egle, supra note 102, at 480 (noting that Justice O'Connor reasoned in Lynch that "[tihe
strength of [the analysis'] application... is that it avoids invalidation of some laws that the Court
has upheld even though they may advance or inhibit religion . . . ").
218. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688. According to Justice O'Connor, excessive entanglement may
interfere with the religious institution's independence, convey to the religious institutions
governmental powers which are not shared by nonadherents, as well as create religiously defined
political constituencies. Id.
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to a minimum.2"9 Second, direct infringement occurs when the government
endorses or disapproves of religion.' Thus, any voucher program that
includes sectarian institutions must not convey a message of governmental
endorsement of religion.
To prevent the conveyance of such a message, several precautions can be
taken when drafting voucher legislation. Justice O'Connor, in a concurring
opinion in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,"i
noted that when the aid to religion is a result of private choice, the objective
observer would not view the aid as an endorsement of religion.' Further,
provided the voucher program does not favor sectarian schools, the government
cannot be accused of sending a message of endorsement.'m Likewise, any
voucher program must be carefully drafted to avoid creating an incentive to
select sectarian over non-sectarian schools by providing assistance regardless of
the institution chosen. Moreover, after Mueller,' whether the challenged law
is neutral on its face is critical.' The Supreme Court recently invalidated a
New York law which sought to create a school district within the exact confines
of a Hasidic Jewish village.' The law violated the Establishment Clause
because the state singled out a religious sect and sought to delegate its power in
219. See supra notes 166-91 and accompanying text. The Mueller case exemplified government
involvement kept to a minimum. Justice O'Connor joined the majority opinion in Mueller and
upheld the Minnesota law against an establishment clause challenge.
220. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). Justice O'Connor commented that
"[e]ndorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community." Id.
221. 474 U.S. 481 (1986). The Court upheld against an Establishment Clause challenge the
state of Washington's extension of vocational assistance to a blind person studying to become a
pastor, missionary or youth director at a private Christian college. Id. at 489. The Court noted that
any state aid which flowed to the sectarian institution was a result of private choice and that the
Washington assistance program applied generally to a broad class of beneficiaries. Id. at 487.
222. Id. at 493 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The aid to religion at issue ... is the result of
private choice. No reasonable observer is likely to draw ... an inference that the State itself
is endorsing a religious practice or belief.").
223. Eric J. Segall, Parochial School Aid Revisited: The Lemon Test, The Endorsement Test
and Religious Liberty, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 263, 292 (1991) (observing that such a practice would
send a message that the government approves of the religious affiliation which it assists, while at
the same time send a message that it disapproves of the religious affiliations which it does not
assist).
224. See supra notes 166-91 and accompanying text for an analysis of the Mueller decision.
225. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 400 (1983) ("The historic purposes of the [Establishment)
Clause simply do not encompass the sort of attenuated financial benefit, ultimately controlled by the
private choices of individual parents, that eventually flows to parochial schools from [a] neutrally
available tax benefit . . . . "). See also Hevly, supra note 143, at 486 (noting that after Mueller,
if a statute is facially neutral it will not be deemed to endorse religion, even if it has the effect of
bestowing a benefit on religion).
226. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
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a manner which did not remain neutral towards religion.2" Thus, a voucher
program must remain facially neutral, like the tax deduction challenged in
Mueller,' so as to not prefer one religion over another or send a message of
governmental endorsement of religion.
The preceding analysis indicates that a properly drafted voucher program
that includes sectarian institutions will survive an establishment clause challenge.
In this respect, the process of drafting the voucher legislation is crucial.
However, even if an establishment clause challenge is successfully defended,
other constitutional challenges may await a choice through voucher
program. 29 The following Section explores the merits of an equal protection
challenge to such a program.
B. Equal Protection Concerns.
Enacted shortly after the Civil War,' the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution was established primarily to secure freedom and equal protection
for former slaves." Despite its primary goal, the Equal Protection
227. Id. at 2494. The Court found the drawing of the school district boundary to meet the
exact shape of the Jewish village to be equivalent to defining a political subdivision on the basis of
a religious criteria. Id.. at 2487, 2490. Furthermore, the Court noted that "the [village] did not
receive its new governmental authority simply as one of many communities eligible for equal
treatment under a general law." Id. at 2491. Since there was no assurance that a similarly situated
group in the future would be granted its own school district and because a failure to act on the part
of the legislature in the future is unreviewable, the law violated the rule of neutrality. Id.
228. See supra note 168.
229. See infra section IHLB., notes 230-66 and accompanying text for an analysis of an equal
protection challenge to a voucher program.
230. The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted during the reconstruction era in 1868.
LOCKHART, supra note 127, at 342. Prior to the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Congress, in 1865, enacted the Thirteenth Amendment which abolished slavery. Id. However, due
to the "Black Codes," blacks did not obtain the full freedom enjoyed by other persons. Id.
Consequently, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was enacted, which gave blacks the same rights as
enjoyed by white citizens in areas such as contract and property rights. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. §§
1981-83 (1988) (protecting property and contract rights, as well as creating a cause of action for
conduct which deprives persons of their constitutional or federal statutory rights while acting under
color of state law). Shortly after the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was passed, Congress began work
on the creation of the Fourteenth Amendment. LOCKHART, supra note 127, at 342. Two years after
the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress conveyed the right to vote to all citizens,
irrespective of "race, color or previous conditions of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend XV.
231. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CASES AND MATERIALS 676 (Foundation
Press, 10th ed. 1980). See also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1872) (noting that the
pervading purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to protect against state laws which
discriminated against blacks and that discriminatory state action not directed at blacks as a class was
not within the purview of the amendment).
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Clause22 of the Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted to impose a
general restraint on the intentional use of discriminatory classifications. 3
232. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in pertinent part,
"[nio State shall make or enforce any law which shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
233. GUNTHER, supra note 231. - While the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment only applies to the states, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been
held to have an equal protection component that applies the same equal protection analysis to the
federal government. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 315-17 (1977) (holding that a social
security provision allowing women to exclude from the computation of an "average monthly wage"
three or more lower earning years than a similarly situated man is constitutional since the provision
was substantially related to an important government interest); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
239 (1976) (noting "that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an equal
protection component prohibiting the United States from invidiously discriminating between
individuals or groups"); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (stating that the
Court's analysis of a Fifth Amendment equal protection claim has always been the same as its
analysis of equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497, 499 (1954) (applying the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment to hold racial
segregation in Washington D.C. public schools unconstitutional). However, the federal government
has been shown some deference by the Court in its equal protection analysis in certain subject areas.
See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) (allowing Congress to deny or condition the
benefit of Medicare to aliens because of Congress' broad power in the area of immigration and
naturalization); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 596-97 (1990) (holding that
"congressionally mandated, benign, race-conscious" programs need only substantially advance
important government interests to survive an equal protection challenge).
The Equal Protection Clause has prohibited improper classifications in several areas. Most
notably, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits classifications based on racial grounds. See Strauder
v. West Virginia., 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (holding that the practice of prohibiting blacks from sitting
on a jury violates the Equal Protection Clause); Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
11 (1967) (noting that "the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications . . . be
subjected to the most rigid scrutiny"). Likewise, classifications based on alienage are also subject
to a strict scrutiny review by the courts. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971)
(holding unconstitutional a state welfare law which conditioned benefits on citizenship because aliens
are an inherently suspect class). But see Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973) (noting
that a state may create classifications based on alienage for positions that are tied up with the
political process or representational democracy); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75-76 (1979)
(validating a New York law forbidding certification of any person who is not a U.S. citizen as a
public school teacher because public school teachers perform "a task that goes to the heart of
representational government'). Further, classifications based on gender or illegitimacy, while
having a lower level of scrutiny than race-based classifications, have also been prohibited by the
Equal Protection Clause. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)
(invalidating a state-supported university policy which limited enrollment in its nursing program to
only women because the policy did not substantially advance an important government interest);
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 464 (1988) (invalidating a six-year statute of limitations for bringing
a paternity action because the limitation did not substantially advance an important government
interest). Finally, classifications created by economic regulation or based on age or mental
retardation are only subject to the minimal traditional equal protection standard of review. See
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2406 (1991) (noting that since age is not a suspect
classification under the Equal Protection Clause, a rational basis review is applied); City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (holding that a classification created by a zoning
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The Equal Protection Clause could pose a barrier to a poorly drafted
voucher program. Opponents of educational vouchers contend that vouchers will
promote racial segregation.' Further, opponents claim that a voucher
program may exclude low-income families from the voucher's benefits if the
amount of the voucher is insufficient to cover the total cost of private
education. 5  Because low-income families will be unable to "add-on" to the
voucher,' the children of these families will be left behind in poorly funded,
understaffed, and low quality schools. 7  The inability to "add-on" to the
voucher and the alleged result of this inability are the root of many equal
protection concerns.
238
The contention that segregation will occur because of choice stems from the
"Freedom of Choice" programs of the 1960s that were designed to evade
desegregation of public schools. 9  Rather than taking affirmative steps to
integrate segregated schools, many school systems allowed students to opt for
a transfer to an all-white or black school. These evasive programs led the
Supreme Court to rule, in Green v. County School Board of New Kent
County,/' that choice programs designed to promote discrimination are
ordinance excluding group homes for the mentally retarded is only subject to a rational basis
analysis); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (deferring to the legislature the wisdom
of the discrimination created by economic legislation by only requiring a rational relation to a
legitimate state interest).
While the Equal Protection Clause protects against improper classifications, the Court has
required intent for any such classifications to violate the clause. See Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (holding that proof of discriminatory
intent is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (requiring de jure discrimination to implicate the Equal Protection Clause).
Thus, a law which is not intentionally discriminatory, either facially or as applied, will not implicate
the clause.
234. Bolick, supra note 29, at 3. Such a program, which requires the state to provide tuition
for parents whose children attend private schools, has recently been discovered by an Atlanta
attorney. Choice Reality, supra note 3, at A22. While this 1961 law was originally enacted to
escape desegregation, choice advocate Senator Roy Allen stated, "[w]e now have a chance to [take]
something born in a darker historical era, and turn it into a bright opportunity for children of all
races." Id.
235. Hevly, supra note 143, at 474 (noting also that the cost of transportation to a private
school may deteriorate the value of the voucher).
236. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
237. See Hevly, supra note 143, at 474.
238. See FAMILY CONTROL, supra note 13 (arguing that an "add-on" will lead to increased
segregation because low-income families are at a severe disadvantage in taking advantage of the
"add-on" feature).
239. Bolick, supra note 29, at 3. See also Choice Reality, supra note 3, at A22 (noting that
one of these such laws, a 1961 Georgia law which was long forgotten, has been targeted by choice
advocates as a source of power to implement a choice program in Georgia).
240. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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unconstitutional." While earlier choice programs may have had
discriminatory intent, no such intent exists with respect to modem choice
programs.' In fact, minority ethnic groups are the most likely to benefit
from modem choice programs.' Thus, while equal protection concerns about
earlier choice programs were genuine, there are no constitutional infirmities with
a modem choice through voucher programs provided that it is carefully drafted.
As in Mueller,' voucher legislation should require all schools, where the
vouchers are redeemable, to adhere to federal and state anti-discrimination
laws' and to specifically prohibit improper classifications. Any school
241. The Green Court held, in light of Brown/ , 349 U.S. 294 (1955), that the 'Freedom-of-
Choice" plan was not a sufficient step to effectuate a transition to a unitary school system. Id. at
441. The Virginia choice plan allowed every student, except those entering first and eighth grade,
to choose between the New Kent and Watkins schools. Id. at 434. Under the plan, students who
do not make a choice between the two schools were assigned to the school that they previously
attended. Id. During the three years in which the "Freedom-of-Choice" program operated, not a
single white child opted to attend the predominately black school. Id. at 441. Also, while some
black children did opt to attend the white schooi, approximately 85 % of all black children attended
an all-black school. Id. Thus, the Court found that despite the option to choose the school, a dual
school system continued to exist. Id.
242. Bolick, supra note 29, at 3. Bolick notes that the objective of modem choice proposals
is to avoid segregation and to expand the opportunities of education. Id. To support his assertions,
Bolick cites an Oregon choice proposal that would have enabled young black students to attend
white-suburban schools. Id. The Oregon proposal was ultimately defeated in November of 1990.
Id.
Further, choice programs are more likely to benefit minority, economically disadvantaged
students in inner city schools. Id. But see Susan Chira, Research Questions Effectiveness of Moss
School-Choice Programs, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 26, 1992, at Al (explaining that a study by the
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching shows that choice primarily benefits children
of better-educated parents and may actually widen the gap between the rich and poor schools). As
noted by Bolick in a separate work, private inner city schools are often more racially diverse than
public inner city schools. CINT BOLICK, CHANGING COURSE: CIVIL RIGHTS AT THE CROSSROADS
108 (Transaction Books 1988). Thus, a program which would allow students to opt for private
education in these instances would promote racial desegregation. It has also been argued that
vouchers will encourage racial commingling that does not occur in the present public school system.
Jeffrey A. Tucker, Evils of Choice; The Danger of Governmental Vouchers for School Choice, 45
NAT'L REV. 44 (1993) (citing John Miller, an associate for the New American Community).
243. Bolick, supra note 29, at 3 (noting that a defeated Oregon choice program would have
enabled black children to attend predominately white suburban schools).
244. It should be noted that the Minnesota statute challenged in Mueller was not challenged on
equal protection grounds but rather under the Establishment Clause. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388 (1983).
245. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (concluding that federal scholarship
funds, even though channeled directly to the students, expose private schools to regulatory coverage
under Title IX). While the exact scope and dimensions of federal nondiscrimination regulations has
not been determined with respect to federal funding of school vouchers, the Grove Cyiy decision
indicates that private schools participating in the program will be subject to these regulations. Also,
the Civil Rights Restoration Act allows the federal government to require an assurance of non-
discrimination for an entire entity, even where only a discrete program within the entity receives
federal funds. 20 U.S.C. § 1687(2) (1988).
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operating contrary to federal or state law would be disqualified from
participating. With this precaution, the voucher program may actually help to
ensure an end to discrimination in education. '
Voucher opponents also argue that a voucher program will lead to
inequality in school funding. 7  Even if such disparity results, the Supreme
Court has rejected this claim as an equal protection violation in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez.' In Rodriguez, a class action 9
was instituted challenging the rather complicated Texas school funding scheme
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' In
general, the distribution scheme resulted in students in wealthier districts
receiving greater funding than students in lower income districts."l The
district court ruled that the funding scheme violated the Equal Protection
Clause. 2 However, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision,
finding that wealth is not a suspect classification and education is not a
246. The anti-discrimination regulations would refuse reimbursement to parents if they send
their children to a racially discriminatory school. Since the voucher will have no value at these
schools, parents and students will migrate away from these schools towards schools which do not
illegally discriminate and where the voucher can be used to help reduce the cost of education. Since
schools naturally have an interest in retaining students in order to retain funding, market forces will
ensure that schools adhere to federal and state anti-discrimination laws and thus remain eligible for
participation in the voucher program.
247. See supra text accompanying note 25.
248. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
249. Id. at 5. The class action was brought on behalf of school children throughout the state
who were members of minority groups and other poor groups residing in an area with a low
property tax base.
250. Id. at 4. The scheme distributed funds for schools within the Texas counties on the basis
of property values within each district. More specifically, local funds were raised from property
taxes imposed on each district. Id. at 10-11. A combination of state and local funds were dispersed
to counties based on the amount of the contribution that county made to the state's income and the
county's share of property taxes. Id. at 10. The county then distributed the funds within itself based
on property values. Id. Districts also subsidized their budgets with income from local property
taxes. Id.
251. Id. at 15. A sampling of 110 Texas school districts revealed a correlation between the
taxable property within a district and the level of per-pupil expenditures in that district. Id. at 15
n.38. The sampling revealed that in districts where the market value of taxable property per pupil
was above $100,000 and median family income was $5900, state and local revenues per pupil
equaled $815. Id. However, only eight percent of the pupils in these districts were minorities. Id.
On the other hand, where the market value of taxable property per pupil was below $10,000 and the
median family income was $3325, state and local revenues per pupil equaled $305. Id. In these
districts with lower property values and median incomes, 79 % of the students were from a minority.
Id. While the sampling revealed a strong inverse relation between minority status and per pupil
expenditures at the extremes, only a partial correlation was found between a family's median income
and expenditures on pupils within the districts. Id.
252. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971) (holding
that wealth is a suspect class and that education is a fundamental right).
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fundamental right.73
In deciding that education is not a fundamental right protected by the Equal
Protection Clause,' the Court noted that the right to an education is not
explicit in the Constitution. 5 Moreover, the guarantee of absolute equality
of education is also not implicitly guaranteed.' Further, even though
education may be linked to fundamental rights, such as speech 7 and
voting,' education itself is not a fundamental right since the most effective
speech or electoral choice is not guaranteed. 9
The Court commented that anything short of "an absolute deprivation of a
meaningful opportunity to enjoy [the state] benefit" will not offend the Equal
Protection Clause. ' The Rodriguez Court found that although some school
253. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18 (1973) (disagreeing with the
lower court's analysis and commenting that, "[it found] neither the suspect-classification nor the
fundamental-interest [in education] analysis persuasive").
254. To determine whether education is a fundamental right under the Equal Protection Clause,
the Court will assess whether a right to education is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution. Id. at 33-34.
255. Id. at 35.
256. See id. The Court noted that the relative social importance of education is not indicative
of whether education is a fundamental right. Id. at 33.
257. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-37 (1973). The Court
discussed but failed to specifically reject the argument that education is essential to the effective
exercise of first amendment freedoms. See also id. at 63 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]here can be
no doubt that education is inextricably linked to the ... rights of free speech ... guaranteed by the
First Amendment."); id. at 112 (Marshall & Douglas, JJ., dissenting) (commenting that education
has a direct causal effect on a person's exercise of his or her first amendment freedoms).
258. Id. at 35-37. As with the discussion pertaining to the relationship between education and
free speech, see supra note 257, the Court discussed but failed to specifically reject the argument
that education is a necessary prerequisite to the effective exercise of the right to vote. See also id.
at 63 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that education is closely tied to the tight to participate in the
electoral process); id. at 113 (Marshall & Douglas, JJ., dissenting) (noting that education serves the
essential role of instilling an understanding and appreciation for the principles and operation of the
political process); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("Americans regard the public schools as a most vital civic institution for
the preservation of a democratic system of government.").
* 259. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1973).
260. Id. at 20. The Court cited as authority for this proposition: Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S.
134 (1972) (invalidating a Texas filing-fee requirement for primary election which effectively barred
potential candidates who were unable to pay the fee); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) and
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (invalidating criminal penalties which subjected indigents
to incarceration because of a failure to pay a fine which they were unable to pay); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (establishing an indigent's right to court appointed counsel on a
direct appeal only when the indigent cannot pay for counsel from private resources and has no other
manner of acquiring representation); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (holding that a state law
requiring payment for acquiring a stenographic transcript was invalid because indigent criminal
defendants were unable to pay for the transcripts and stating that no constitutional violation would
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districts received a smaller share of the educational resources, there was no
absolute deprivation of education. 6  Since there was not an absolute
deprivation of education, the state easily met the rational basis standard of
review. 62
The Court also reasoned that because the classification did not possess any
indication of suspectness, strict judicial review would not be employed.3'
Rather, the Court employed a rational basis review. Just as with the
fundamental right analysis, the state easily met this standard.6 4
While it is undoubtedly true that relative inequalities between schools will
continue to exist even with a voucher plan, the Court has made clear that this
is not sufficient to violate the Equal Protection Clause.2 5 As long as no
absolute deprivation of education exists, any disparity in education caused by a
voucher program will not offend the Equal Protection Clause.'
have existed had the state provided some "adequate substitution" for a stenographic transcript).
261. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 23-25.
262. Hevly, supra note 143, at 475. Under a rational basis review, there is a presumption of
constitutionality and the court will only require that the challenged classification be rationally related
to a legitimate state interest. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). Further,
the court will assume all facts necessary to find a rational basis and sustain the law. United States
R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980). Moreover, under a rational basis review,
the legislature may act one step at a time to eradicate a problem without violating the Equal
Protection Clause. Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303.
263. As noted by the Court, classifications based on wealth are not endowed with the
disabilities traditionally found in suspect classifications. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). Furthermore, there was no indication that the class had suffered
a history of intentional discrimination. Id. Likewise, members of a classification based on wealth
have not been disadvantaged by a history of political powerlessness. Id. Thus, the Court concluded
that a classification based on wealth, unlike traditional suspect classifications, did not require
protection from the majoritarian political process. Id.
264. See supra note 262.
265. See supra notes 247-64 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 262 and accompanying text. Although education is not a fundamental right
under the federal constitution, several state constitutions have granted such status to education. See
Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590, 592 (Ariz. 1973) (holding that the state constitution establishes
that "education [is] a fundamental right of pupils between the ages of six and twenty-one"); State
v. Stecher, 390 A.2d 408, 410 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977) (holding that the right to education "is so
basic and fundamental that any infringement of. . . [it] must be strictly scrutinized"); Skeen v.
State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993) (holding that in light of the importance of education, as
well as the explicit language used in the state constitution, education is a fundamental right);
Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d 457, 468-69 (Mich. 1972) (holding that in light of the state history
respecting education, it is a fundamental right under the state constitution); Seattle Sch. Dist. No.
I of King County v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 91-92 (Wash. 1978) (en bane) (holding that a paramount
right to a public education flows from the existence of the paramount duty imposed upon the state
legislature by the state constitution to provide a public education); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d
568, 579 (Wis. 1989) (holding that the right to equal educational opportunity is fundamental under
the state's constitution); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333
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IV. PROPOSAL FOR A FEDERAL VOUCHER PROGRAM
While various states have attempted to implement numerous types of choice
or voucher systems, W7 none have taken the step to dedicate and implement a
comprehensive choice through voucher program. Such a program must
adequately subsidize the parents' and child's choice so as to make nonpublic
education a realistic alternative. The legislation proposed by this Note will
provide parents and children with that realistic choice.
As opponents of voucher programs correctly note, all of society has a stake
in an individual's education.' Thus, the government should promote quality
education. The public school system's failure to adequately educate its students
must be remedied. Therefore, the federal government, acting according to its
spending' and Commerce Clause powers,2' should implement a voucher
program to inject competition into the public school marketplace. Without
question, an attempt to improve the nation's educational system is within the
(Wyo. 1980) (holding that the state constitution requires the conclusion that education is of
fundamental interest). However, since this note proposes federal voucher legislation, an analysis
of state constitutional law respecting the right to an education is beyond the scope of this note.
267. See Nathan, supra note 95 (stating that 80 % of the states have school choice programs
of some sort); supra notes 95-116 and accompanying text (discussing several state choice and
voucher programs).
268. Raywid, supra note 60, at 763 (arguing that the concept of education as a public good is
crucial to the maintenance of a proper public education system).
269. The Spending Clause of the Constitution states, in pertinent part, "The Congress shall have
Power To lay and collect Taxes . . . and (to] provide for the . . . general Welfare of the United
States . . . . " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Initially, there were two competing views as to the Framer's intent regarding the scope of the
"general welfare" provision. ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON & IVAN E. BODENSTEINER, CIVIL RIGHTS
LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION 1-32 (1994); James V. Corbelli, Note, Tower of Power: South
Dakota v. Dole and The Strength of The Spending Power, 49 U. PIrr. L. REV. 1097, 1100 (1988).
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson viewed this provision as limited by the enumerated powers
set forth in Article I, § 8. LEVINSON & BODENSTEINER, supra; Corbelli, supra. However,
Alexander Hamilton and James Monroe viewed the general welfare clause as conferring spending
power beyond the enumerated powers to any "national purpose" within the term "general welfare."
LEVISON & BODENSTEINER, supra, at 1-32. The Court, in 1936, adopted the Hamilton view of the
general welfare clause. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
However, spending power is nonetheless limited. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207
(1987). The Court has expressed at least four limits on this power possessed by Congress. Id.
First, any exercise of spending power must be in pursuit of the general welfare, a fairly deferential
standard. Id. Next, any conditioning of federal funds must be done unambiguously, so as to enable
the states to exercise their choice cognizant of the consequences of their participation. Id. Third,
any condition on federal funds must be related to the national interest, in particular national
programs. Id. Finally, other constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar to the
conditional grant of federal funds. Id. at 208.
270. The Commerce Clause states, in pertinent part, "The Congress shall have power to
regulate commerce... among the several states.. .. " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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easily met "general welfare" requirement. Clearly, it is possible for Congress
to rationally perceive that education affects interstate commerce. z ' TheSupreme Court has held that Congress can regulate state schools through itsCommerce Clause power.'m The Court has shown considerable deference toCongress in determining whether an expenditure program is within thisprovision.2" Thus, Congress has the power to remedy what the states have
271. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). Thecourt in Hodel demonstrated that the Court will only inquire into two elements when determiningif Congress has acted within its commerce power. First, there must be a rational basis supporting
a congressional finding that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce. Id. at 276 (citingHeart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung,379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964)). Second, the means adopted by Congress must be reasonably adaptedto a legitimate end. Id. (citing Heart ofAdanta, 379 U.S. at 262; United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.100, 121 (1941)). Under this very lax standard, a congressional determination that education affectsinterstate commerce will be sustained. In fact, the model legislation that this note proposesauthorizes parents and students to choose schools which are outside their state. See infra sectionIV.A. With this potential for traffic across state lines, Congress will certainly have a rational basisfor concluding that the commerce clause power authorizes such a statute.272. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). In Wirtz, the state of Maryland, joined by27 other states and one school district, sought to enjoin the application of the Fair Labor StandardsAct to schools and hospitals operated by the states or its branches, contending that coverage of state-
operated schools and hospitals was beyond the commerce power. Id. at 187. As amended, the Act
extends protection to all employees of any enterprise engaged in commerce or production forcommerce, so long as the enterprise also falls within certain enumerated categories. 29 U.S.C. §206 (1988). With respect to schools, the amended Fair Labor Standards Act would apply to "[an]
elementary or secondary school . . . regardless of whether or not such . . . school is public orprivate or operated for profit or not for profit." 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(5) (1988).
The Wirtz Court concluded that there was a rational basis for congressional action prescribing
minimum labor standards for schools and hospitals. Wirrz, 392 U.S. at 195. The Court noted thatschools are major users of goods imported from other states. Id. at 194 (citing that $38.3 billionwill be spent by state and local public education institutions in the United States). Furthermore, theCourt noted that 87% of the $8 million spent by Maryland's public school system during the 1965fiscal year represented direct interstate purchases. Id. Thus, the Court found a rational basis for
congressional action based on the Commerce Clause. Id.
As in Wirtz, congressional action based on the Commerce Clause will satisfy the rationality
standard. Clearly, modern public education systems engage in interstate purchases. Id. While some
schools may purchase textbooks, others may purchase chalk or blackboards from other states.Furthermore, any de minimis character of discrete instances of interstate commerce activity will notforeclose commerce power. The Court, in Wickard v. Filburn, held that if the cumulative effect ofan activity affects interstate commerce, then Congress may regulate that activity. 317 U.S. 111(1942). Thus, even if one act would not affect interstate commerce, that activity can be reached byCongress when the aggregate effect of the activity would substantially effect interstate commerce.Therefore, Congress has commerce power to enact legislation which reaches public schools.273. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (discussing the scope of the generalwelfare clause the Court stated, "[t]he discretion ... is not confided to the courts. The discretionbelongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not anexercise of judgement"); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) ("In considering whethera particular expenditure is intended to serve general public purposes, courts should defer
substantially to the judgement of Congress.").
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been unable to correct. Importantly, an improved education system will allow
American students to better compete with those from abroad and will also
improve industry within the country.
2
1'
The federal government could promote a higher quality of education by
amending the Internal Revenue Code. An amendment to the Internal Revenue
Code could implement a voucher program that would achieve substantially the
same benefits as one implemented by the states. In light of the states' failure
to remedy the nation's troubled education system, the need for federal legislation
is evident. 5 The proposed amendment will implement a voucher system that
will better enable parents and students to choose from the variety of alternative
private schools, thereby forcing public schools to attempt to attract students to
retain the state funding that is determined on a per pupil attendance basis.2
6
Public schools will be forced to compete with private schools for students and,
as in any competitive market, the quality of services will rise.' The twin
goals of returning greater parental control and improving the quality of education
will both be served by the proposed legislation. The amendment proposed to the
Internal Revenue Code will reach all Americans who have children in either
elementary or secondary education. The following Section proposes model
legislation for an educational choice through voucher program.
274. A better educated population will be more suited to adapt to changing working conditions
and will generally learn job skills more quickly. See Kirkland, supra notes 6 & 41. Furthermore,
the House of Representatives made a congressional finding that superior education better enables one
to compete "fully and successfully in the world economy." H.R. 2460, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., Title
I, § 101(2); S. 1411, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., Title I, § 101(2) (1991).
275. While some states have taken steps to improve their educational system, even these
attempts have had little success. See H.R. 2460, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(2); S. 1411, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(2) (1991) (noting that "educational reforms of the 1980s were too slow and
too timid; a bolder and more comprehensive effort that involves the citizens of every American
community is needed"). Thus, Congress should intervene in this crucial area and help improve a
sector of our nation which is of vital importance to the nation's prosperity.
276. See McClerkin v. San Mateo Sch. Dist., 49 P.2d 830, 831-32 (Cal. 1935) (holding that
where children attend school in a neighboring school district with the consent of that district, the
district that the child attends is entitled to receive funds which are based upon attendance from the
state school fund); Smith v. Maynard, 107 S.E.2d 815, 818 (Ga. 1959) (holding that contracts
between county and city school boards, which obligated city schools to teach certain children
residing outside the city's school system, obligated the county to pass on to the city school board
state funds it received based on pupil attendance); Durant v. Department of Educ., 463 N.W.2d 461,
474 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that when a local school district contracts with an intermediate
school district for the provision of special education programs, the students of the local school
district become students of the intermediate school district for purposes of calculating state aid);
Schools, supra note 9, § 95 (noting that where a child attends a school in a district other than the
district in which the child resides, the district in which the child attends school generally receives
the apportionment of the school funds); Tellier, supra note 68 (noting that funding to public schools
is calculated on a per pupil basis).
277. HYMAN, supra note 12, at 455 (noting that in a competitive market the maximum net
benefit can be squeezed out of all resources).
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A. The Educational Revitalization Choice Through Voucher Act
Section 1-Purpose: This Act shall be known as the Educational Revitalization
Choice Through Voucher Act. The purpose of this Act is to revitalize
America's educational system by introducing competition into the market for
educational services through supporting and assisting the parental choice of
education in a non-discriminatory manner. This Act will support and assist any
choice, or group of possible choices, of education that is within the meaning of
this Act without discrimination or favoritism towards any one.
Section 2-Definitions: This Act shall be interpreted in accordance with the
following subsections.
Section 2.1-Tuition: The term "tuition" shall include any expense or
amount charged or required and tendered for attendance at the chosen
educational institution, but shall not include any taxes paid that may support
public educational institutions.
Section 2.2-Related Expenses: The term "related expenses" shall include
any expense or amount charged or required and tendered for transportation
to and from the educational institution, as well as textbooks and other
instructional material used in teaching and educational instruction of only
those subjects legally taught in the state's public schools. Transportation
to or from any noneducational activity in connection with the school, such
as extracurricular activities, or any other expenses incurred in such
activities, are not within the meaning of this subsection.
Section 2.3-Educational Institution: The term "educational institution"
shall include any institution, public, private, or sectarian, which is
accredited by the Department of Education in the respective state, and
which adheres to the provisions of Section 4 of this Act.
Section 2.4-Elementary and Secondary: The term "elementary and
secondary" shall be construed to include grade levels Kindergarten through
twelve.
Section 3-Tuition and Expenses: Any amount paid for tuition and related
expenses at an approved elementary or secondary educational institution per
academic year, as established by the educational institution, the local school
district, or other authorized body, regardless of the location of that educational
institution, may be deducted from the taxpayer's gross taxable income, not to
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exceed one thousand five hundred dollars ($1500)' per dependent. In the
event that the gross taxable income is less than an amount equal to one thousand
five hundred dollars ($1500) multiplied by the number of dependents utilizing
this Act, the taxpayer may apply for a credit with the Department of Treasury
for the difference, not to exceed one thousand five hundred dollars ($1500) per
dependent.
Section 3. 1-Promulgation of Rules: The Internal Revenue Service is
authorized and directed to promulgate rules respecting procedures for the
application and receipt of any credit authorized under this Act.
Section 4-Equal Educational Opportunity: In order to qualify as an educational
institution within the meaning of this Act, the institution's policies, practices,
customs, and admissions requirements shall not discriminate on the basis of
gender, religion, race, color, disability, or national origin; the institution shall
also adhere to the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1991 and any statutory
counterpart in the respective state in which the educational institution is located.
B. An Analysis of The Revitalization Act
The Revitalization Act will inject competition into the public school system
through a voucher plan that better enables parents and children to choose among
alternative forms of education. This legislation provides parents and children
with the ability to leave the public school system and pursue nonpublic
education. The Revitalization Act levels the playing field between public and
private schools. Without a voucher program, consumers of education have a
choice between free public education and costly private education. Thus, while
competition among schools has never been forbidden, in reality, public schools
enjoy a distinct advantage over private schools because there is no price
associated with public education. 9  If parents and children are given the
278. As noted earlier, the exact value of the voucher can be the entire cost of educating a child
in the public school system or less so as to provide a savings to the government. See supra note 73
and accompanying text. It is beyond the scope of this note to determine a precise amount for such
a proposal. The amount expressed in this model legislation was selected for illustrative purposes
only.
279. Public education is not "free' in the strict sense. Public education is generally financed
through state and local taxes. 1 JAMES A. RAPP, EDUCATION LAw 5-20.31 to 20.32 (1994).
However, this type of funding is compulsory and shared by all taxpayers. Thus, when one considers
whether to attend a public or private school by weighing the costs and benefits, the true price of
public education, the taxes paid for public education, is not considered because it must be paid
regardless of the choice made. This results in the perception that public education is "free."
An example of the above reasoning may prove helpful. When a person is choosing between
buying a Ford and a Chevy, the price and quality of each is generally a major consideration. As
a result, both Ford and Chevy respond to the consumer's reaction to the price and quality of their
automobiles. However, if the person was previously compelled to finance the production of Ford
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financial ability to choose a nonpublic school, public schools will be forced to
realistically compete with nonpublic schools, and an increase in the overall
quality of education will be realized.
As noted above,' these alternative forms of education may consist of
any public, private, or sectarian institution that meets minimal requirements.
The minimal requirements that should be imposed are beyond the scope of this
Note. However, these requirements should assure a basic competence of the
instructors and facilities and no more."' Accordingly, the Revitalization Act
only requires accreditation by the state's department of education.
automobiles and thus was entitled to a Ford without any further financial obligation, the effect of
consumer choice on quality is drastically reduced. This person would have a strong preference for
the Ford because the Ford is "free." Since there was no choice in whether to finance Fordproduction, funds taken for such production are a sunken cost. Thus, when faced with the choice
between a Chevy, at the normal market price, and a Ford, which is "free" because of the compelledfinancing, the person will have strong motivation to opt for the Ford. All things equal, including
quality, there seems to be no drastic effect to the end result since the person nonetheless obtains an
automobile. However, in a market situation as described above, all things will not be equal,
especially quality.
Since Ford is aware that it will be financed through compulsion, it will have little incentive
to finance its own production through the competitive sale of automobiles. While the two
corporations would generally have to compete with each other for sales which would in turn finance
their operations, when one corporation knows it will receive financing without having to compete,
there is little if any incentive to compete. Thus, Ford will have little concern about the quality of
its product because it is assured of adequate financing due to the compulsory financing. Thus, the
Ford need not measure up against other automobiles. Likewise, consumers will be satisfied with
a lower quality product because there is no price tag associated with the Ford.
The same analogy applies to the educational market. Public education is assured of financing
because of compulsory taxation. Thus, public education will have little concern about matters ofquality because public education is viewed as "free" while competitors are correctly viewed as
having a price tag associated with them. This model legislation removes that price tag image from
nonpublic education. In turn, the choice between public and nonpublic schools becomes a realistic
possibility. Therefore, public schools will be forced to fairly compete will nonpublic schools. This
will compel public schools to focus on the quality of their service so that they may attract consumers
away from competitors. As in any competitive market, quality will improve.
280. See supra text accompanying note 276.
281. A requirement of any more than minimal standards will open the door to the now existing
bureaucracy of the public educational system. So long as the state maintains a minimally acceptable
level of service, the market will assure higher standards if parents demand higher standards. This
will increase choice among schools because the parents and students, as the consumers of education,
will decide what level of education should be maintained. As in any free market, the consumer will
seek out the best service for the best price, thus forcing schools to increase the quality of their
educational service. Therefore, it should be for the market, not the state, to determine the level of
education that will prevail above the minimally established standards.
Terry M. Moe, co-author of Politics, Markets, and American Schools, envisions the minimal
regulation. Paul Wallich, The Business of Education, Sci. AM., Oct. 1992, at 117. A set of
nationwide standardized tests that students must pass could be used to maintain school accreditation.
Id. This would ensure that students are in fact learning, while keeping the bureaucratic red tape out
of the schools.
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In light of the fact that the model Act seeks to include sectarian schools
within the program, an Establishment Clause challenge is imminent.'
2
However, because the careful drafting of the Revitalization Act is mindful of
current establishment clause jurisprudence, particularly the traditional Lemon
test,283 the statute will survive a challenge brought under this clause. As to
the first prong of Lemon, the Court has given considerable deference to the
legislature's stated purpose,'8 and legislative attempts to improve education,
even if they involve benefits to sectarian schools, have been upheld as
sufficiently secular.
The true challenge will come under the primary effects prong of Lemon.
Many of the same factors discussed below also ensure that the Act will pass
scrutiny under a Zobrest analysis. First, the Act is facially neutral and is
available to a broad class of beneficiaries without regard to the nature of the
institution chosen. Further, the legislation creates no incentive to attend a
sectarian school. Since the voucher can be used at any approved school, rather
than solely sectarian schools, there will be no governmentally created incentive
to send students to sectarian schools. The assistance provided by the Act is not
dependant on the religious nature of the educational institution. Additionally,
the benefit to a sectarian school, if any, will occur as a result of private choices
by parents. The Revitalization Act provides assistance to the parents of school
children, not the educational institution itself. Only through the independent
choice of the parent can the institution benefit from the assistance provided by
the Revitalization Act. Moreover, even if the bulk of beneficiaries under the
statute used the voucher to assist in their choice to send their children to
sectarian schools, the Court has made clear that this action will not violate the
primary effects prong. The above factors will also be of importance if the
Court chooses to side-step the Lemon analysis,' as it did in Zobrest.
87
Modem establishment clause jurisprudence indicates that the Revitalization Act
will survive a challenge under the primary effects prong of Lemon.
Finally, as long as the state injects itself only to assure minimal quality, the
Revitalization Act will not run afoul of the excessive entanglement prong of
Lemon.s The Revitalization Act calls for the school to meet only the
minimal standards of accreditation to which all schools must adhere. Therefore,
the proposed statute is likely to survive this third prong of the Lemon test.
282. See supra note 118.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 139-47.
284. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 203-09 and accompanying text.
287. 113 U.S. 2462 (1993).
288. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
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Alternatively, the Revitalization Act will also satisfy Justice O'Connor's
endorsement test' for many of the same reasons that it will not have the
primary effect of advancing religion under Lemon.' The objective observer
would not view the model Act as an endorsement of religion because the model
Act creates no incentive to attend a sectarian institution, and any benefit to such
an institution would be a result of the private decisions of parents. Further,
persons with children in an elementary or secondary educational institution can
avail themselves of the federal aid. The model Act in no way sends a message
to anyone that the government is endorsing religion or that nonadherents are
political outsiders. Thus, the statute does not pose establishment clause concerns
because the statute will survive a challenge under Lemon and does not send a
message of religious endorsement by government.
The Revitalization Act will also survive the neutrality test that the Court
recently employed in the Grumet school district case."' The Revitalization
Act neither creates political subdivisions based on religion nor delegates
governmental power to religious institutions. While remaining facially neutral
towards religion, the Act allows parents to choose the best school for their
children. As was significant under the Lemon and endorsement tests, the fact
that the sectarian schools are benefitted only after private choices of parents will
likely be an important element to sustaining the Act under a neutrality analysis.
Therefore, the Revitalization Act's validity is not threatened under the scrutiny
of the neutrality principle.
Furthermore, because the statute requires all participating schools to adhere
to federal and state anti-discrimination laws, as well as to refrain from
discrimination on the basis of gender, religion, race, color, disability, or
national origin, an equal protection argument will also fail.' The statute, on
its face, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it does not infringe
on fundamental rights, and it creates no suspect or quasi-suspect classifications.
As shown by Rodriguez, absolute educational equality is not a fundamental
right and any wealth classification created by the Act is not considered suspect.
Therefore, a facial equal protection challenge will undoubtedly fail.
Additionally, any challenge to the statute as applied will also be successfully
overcome. An "as applied" challenge will fail because the statute disqualifies
any institution that does not comport with the broad anti-discrimination
requirement of the statute. Moreover, the Revitalization Act indicates no
289. See supra text accompanying notes 215-28.
290. See supra notes 181-88 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 248-66 and accompanying text.
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purpose or intent to discriminate. While a statute that is otherwise facially
neutral cannot be applied in a discriminatory manner and remain valid under the
Equal Protection Clause,' the Revitalization Act disqualifies any institution
which seeks to apply the neutral requirements of the Act in a discriminatory
fashion. Thus, the model Act's language prevents any institution from applying
the benefits of the Act in a discriminatory manner and yet remain eligible to
participate in the program.
Moreover, any disparity in funding among schools that results from this
program will not render the Act violative of the Equal Protection Clause as
made clear by the Court in Rodriguez.' So long as the model Act does not
completely eliminate the opportunity for education, any disparity in funding will
not be of constitutional significance. The Revitalization Act does not deprive
any person of the opportunity for an education. In fact, the model Act will
increase the overall quality of education, making every person's educational
opportunities more meaningful. Therefore, a constitutional challenge under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment will be unsuccessful.
V. CONCLUSION
Education has and will continue to play a major role in American
society.' However, the quality of some of America's public schools leaves
much to be desired. The federal government should address these problems
because the states have failed to adequately improve their educational systems.
A federal choice through voucher program is an innovative attempt to improve
the quality of education. The America 2000 program proposed by the Bush
administration was opposed by many groups and such groups are likely to
oppose the Revitalization Act.' However, arguments against the Act based
on constitutional grounds are without merit, and policy arguments favor such an
innovative solution.
Voucher programs have gained much support but have also come under
considerable scrutiny by their opponents. While opponents claim vouchers will
cause segregation among students, a choice through voucher program, such as
the Revitalization Act, will actually decrease the already existing segregation.
The Revitalization Act provides children from lower-income families with a
viable choice to attend a school they would otherwise be unable to afford.
Further, despite the contentions by voucher opponents, the Equal Protection and
294. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (noting that the discriminatory
purpose need not be expressed in the statute for a law to fail under equal protection scrutiny).
295. See supra notes 248-66 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 6-7, 41.
297. See supra notes 85-94 (discussing America 2000).
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Establishment Clauses of the Constitution will not prevent a carefully and
properly written voucher program from being implemented.
The Revitalization Act, a choice through voucher program, will improve
the quality of education by injecting competition into the educational market.
Such a program will allow nonpublic schools of all types to compete with public
schools for students and thus force the public school system to focus on thequality of its service. The injection of competition in the educational
marketplace will cause the quality of all education to rise. The Educational
Revitalization Choice Through Voucher Act will enure to the benefit of allAmericans by better preparing the nation's children for what awaits them in the
world marketplace.
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